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- SICEP Graduate Student Conference on East Asian Confucian Thought
- SICEP Graduate Student Conference on East Asian Confucian Thought *Event postponed due to outbreak of Corona Virus Time to be announced SICEP is proud to sponsor a two-day graduate student conference on the campus of Sungkyunkwan University to be held 8-9 May 2020. The aim of the conference is to provide graduate students in Korea who are working on East Asian Confucian Thought an opportunity to present their work in English in a public forum, receive feedback with an eye to strengthening their research, and have the opportunity to meet and exchange ideas with fellow students and faculty. Our event includes graduate students from a broad range of Korean institutions and welcomes the participation of professors and fellow students as members of the audience. Our aim is to foster and strengthen the research of advanced Korean graduate students in a challenging collegial setting. Speaker 1 Seo, Jaehyun (Sungkyunkwan University) “Rebuilding the spectrum of “the way of the true king” (wangdao 王道)" Abstract Even though Mencius served King Xuan of Qi and Duke Wen of Teng as their moral coach, it seems that they faced certain hurdles that made it difficult for them to become “rulers who attain the royal dignity” (wangzhe 王者). In this paper, I explore one of the core challenges concerning how to define the wangdao theory of Mencius. The difficulty I wish to analyze concerns the challenge of distinguishing three figures “a person who practices benevolence” (xingrenzhe 行仁者)”, “a person who pretends to benevolence” (jiarenzhe 假仁者) and “a person who is not benevolent” (burenzhe 不仁者). This challenge is connected to the problem of differentiating “the way of the true king” (wangdao 王道), “the way of the hegemon” (badao 覇道) and the rest. In Mencian philosophy. Mencius 2A3 seems to say that there can be no compromise between those two concepts, but I will argue that there are at least two different views one can have on this issue. One is repositioning the status of the hegemons. By rebuilding a spectrum of Mencius’ wangdao exposition, I’ll retain the position where three figures would be positioned. Another point of view is that since there is only a slight and delicate difference between these figures, there is still a possibility for such a king to become a “ruler who attains the royal dignity” (wangzhe 王者) by aiding his self-cultivation. Speaker 2 Song, Jihye (Seoul National University) “The idea of “upright writing(直筆)” in Chinese historiography” Abstract In writing the Veritable Records of the Joseon Dynasty (朝鮮王祖實錄), the public historical records compiled after each king’s reign, Joseon’s political actors resorted to the normative ideal of “true writing” (zhíbǐ 直筆) in order to justify what to write in the Records and how to write it. In the process, each actor supported a different understanding of the ideal of “true writing”: some argued that it meant writing truly (zhí 直) about what they saw and heard without interjecting any personal judgment, while others argued that the essence of “true writing” was writing about events with an upright (zhí 直) mind and some details could be omitted or exaggerated. Since the idea of the “true” (zhí 直) as developed in the Confucian tradition largely informed their understanding of “true writing,” the controversy over its proper meaning can be understood in terms of contestation over the idea of the “true” (zhí 直) which developed over the course of the Confucian tradition since the debate between Confucius and the Duke of Shi (Lunyu 13.18). This paper locates the Joseon’s political actors’ controversy over the normative ideal of “true writing” in the historical debate over the idea of the “true” (zhí 直). By doing so, I aim to elaborate how the Confucian idea of the “true” (zhí 直) was contested and transformed in the course of writing the Veritable Records of the Joseon Dynasty. Speaker 3 Lee, Joonpyo (Sungkyunkwan University) “The Self Controlling Role of Ritual” Abstract The aim of this presentation is to reconsider the meaning of the phrase kejifuli 克己復禮 within the intellectual environment of the pre-Qin period. This presentation intends to reconstruct the meaning of kejifuli based on the Han commentaries, instead of the Song commentaries which interpret Ji to mean self-centered desires and fuli as to mean returning to ritual, which implies perfect virtue. Contrary to what the Song commentators claim, in the Analects, Confucius did not regard Ji as implying negative, self-centered aspects of the self or understand ritual (li 禮) in terms of principle (理). In this presentation I attempt to interpret kejifuli based on the logic of the tradition of Han Commentaries who explained kejifuli using other passages in the Analects. To be specific, I argue that Han commentators offered interpretations that were more thoroughly consistent with the Analects than the Song commentators. Speaker 4 Cho, Hyunill (Chonnam National University) "Cognitive approaches to the origin of Xiunzi's morality" Abstract The purpose of this presentation is to explain the origin of Xunzi's morality by showing how people who begin life with an originally bad nature can create morality. Many scholars have tried to explain the origin of morality in Xunzi by saying that even if humans have the ability to create morality, human nature cannot help but tend toward badness. But these scholars cannot explain what kind of human ability can make it possible, nor the kind of factors and processes involved in creating that morality. I believe that conceptual blending theory, which shows the source of human imagination and creativity, is by far the best framework by which to identify the resolution to Xunzi's morality. By using this theoretical foundation, I suggest that human creativity and imagination make it possible for Xunzi to explain how human beings, who begin life with a bad nature, can create morality. Speaker 5 Choi, Guk (Sungkyunkwan University) “The Problem of Underdetermination in the Mencian Discussion of Nature (xing 性)” Abstract Mencius tries to show the goodness of human nature by providing a thought experiment in which human beings would have the same response such as in the case of seeing a child about to fall into a well (Mencius 2A6). This thought experiment consists of certain given circumstance C and corresponding response R. Generalized from 2A6, we can say that Mencius tries to show K’s nature (K in the sense that k is an individual member belonging to certain species K) by providing conditional sentence, whose form is if k is under C, it would make response R. However, this formulation for showing K’s nature has a crucial problem, because there might be other cases in which all ks have the same responses in other different situations, and if this is so, which case among them actually demonstrates K’s nature is not determined. I call this “the problem of underdetermination.” However, in this paper, I will argue that Mencius’s discussion of human nature avoids this problem of underdetermination, and I will show how he could do so. Speaker 6 Kim, Taehwan (Sogang University) “Argument on the Democratic and Republican Aspects of Dasan Jeong Yakyong’s (茶山 丁若鏞) Political Theory” Abstract Studies in Korea about the writings of Dasan Jeong Yak-yong(茶山 丁若鏞, 1762~1836), who is a scholar of the late Joseon dynasty, cover a variety of fields, as many as the variety of fields he wrote about. In regard to his political philosophy, many researches have focused on whether his political ideas are compatible with or support democracy. Some think this is so, because of Dasan’s idea that people are the fundament of the state (民本) and an inappropriate monarch should be replaced by his subjects; ideas that can be interpreted as the sprout of a conception of popular sovereignty. But others think Dasan’s political ideas are not compatible with democracy, because his ideas derive from the time Mencius (孟子, BC 372~BC 289), and he seemed to think that feudal lords (諸侯) and not people are the only legitimate agents of such revolutionary changes. I support the latter view. Despite this interest in Dasan’s political thought, there is scarcely any research on whether and how Dasan’s political theory might be connected to or relevant for republicanism. Republicanism has been understood in many ways but for the purposes of my paper will be defined as political systems characterized by checks and balances of power. From this perspective, we can see that Dasan hardly thought a system of checks and balances of power important and instead focused on increasing the power of the monarch. His ideas in this regard reflect the influence of political factions (朋黨) in mid-Joseon dynasty, which resulted in weakening the system of checks and balances that were in place and regulated behavior among the king, ministers, and censors, inspectors, and instructors, which constituted a pseudo-republicanism form of constitutionalsim in the early and mid-periods of the Joseon dynasty. For these reasons, I will argue that Dasan’s political philosophy is relevant to neither democracy nor republicanism as the dominant ideologies of government in the modern world. Speaker 7 Park, Seongun (Seoul National University) “A use of the foreign policy legacy of the Hongwu Emperor” Abstract In this article I analyze a use of the political legacy of Zhu Yuanzhang (the Hongwu Emperor, 1328–1398,r. 1368–1398) who, as the founding emperor of Ming dynasty, was enthusiastic about adopting Neo-Confucianism as state orthodoxy. To be specific, I shall examine how the foreign policy legacy of the Hongwu Emperor – his principle of noninterventionist foreign policy inscribed in the Huang Ming zuxun (The August Ming Ancestral Instruction) and in his policy precedents dealing with neighboring countries – was interpreted, appropriated, and challenged in Ming court in the first half of the sixteenth century. At that time, the Jiajing Emperor (1507–1567, r. 1521–67) took note of the fact that the Vietnamese minister Mac Dang Dung (1483–1541) rebelled against his king. This posed a serious challenge to Ming China because he usurped the throne recognized by the Chinese emperor. The Ming court was divided into two camps with respect to whether to raise an army to punish him for his crime. On the one hand, those who opposed war supported a ‘literal interpretation’ of the Hongwu Emperor’s injunction, arguing that as long as the founding emperor documented the noninterventionist policy toward both Korea and Vietnam as an unchanging principle of Ming foreign policy, the Jiajing Emperor had to follow suit. On the other hand, the pro-war advocates attempted to establish a more ‘flexible interpretation’ of his political legacy. They pointed out that because the sixteenth-century situation differed significantly from that of the fourteenth century, during which Zhu Yuanzhang outlined his noninterventionist policy toward both Korea and Vietnam, a flexible interpretation of his injunction was appropriate. It should be noted that not only the Hongwu Emperor’s foreign policy toward Vietnam but also his policy toward Korea was a crucial reference in the formation of the sixteenth-century foreign policy toward Vietnam. As people during Jiajing’s reign saw it, Mac Dang Dung’s usurpation of the Vietnamese throne was similar in nature to the dynastic change that took place in late fourteenth-century Korea. To better understand this complex policy-making process, we need a multilateral framework that encompasses Ming China, Vietnam, and Korea, just as the policy makers of the mid-Ming court did. However, most prior studies on this issue tend to focus solely on bilateral relations, analyzing the Sino-Vietnamese and Sino-Korean relationships separately. This bilateral approach fails to capture the complex multilateral reality of sixteenth-century East Asia. Speaker 8 Lee, Yoon-seok (Sungkyunkwan University) “A Korean Philosopher’s Analysis of Qiwulun (齊物論)” Abstract Han Won Jin was an 18th-century Neo-Confucian of the Joseon dynasty, who organized and published work on Zhu-Xi(朱熹)’s commentaries and presented his own interpretation of the Chinese classics. What is unusual is that among his writings, there is an interpretation of the Zhuang-zi (莊子). It is difficult to find works that directly focus on the thought of Zhung-zi among the writings of other Neo-Confucianist of the Joseon dynasty. I propose to analyze and understand his work. Specially, I shall examine Han’s interpretation of the Qiwulun (齊物論) chapter of the Zhuang-zi. I will focus my attention on this chapter because he regarded it as the most important part of Zhuang-zi and devoted consideration effort to explaining it. Han Won Jin divides the full context of the Qiwulun into 31 paragraphs aimed at explaining the process of uniting(齊一) the a lot of argument(物論) in the world. And because he use the concept of Neo-Confucianism and its meanings for explaining the Qiwulun (齊物論) in these paragraphs, I will especially focus on this kind of aspects. By doing this, I will examine the ideas revealed in Han Won Jin’s interpretation by carefully analyzing his reconstruction of the Qiwulun. Speaker 9 Lee, AhYoung (Korea University) “Revisiting the Concept of Wu-wei Statecraft in the Analects” Abstract Wu-wei statecraft, which is commonly referred to as a politics of non-action or no action, is a seemingly paradoxical concept. While it is well-established that it is one of the core ideas in Daoist philosophy, many believe that wu-wei not only represents the essence of Confucian statecraft but also has played an extremely important role in the development of Chinese philosophy. It is worth noting that the term seldom appears in the essential texts of Confucianism. In the case of the Four Books, wu-wei appears only once, in the Analects. It is not clear how the concept can play such an important role in Confucian political theory, given that it appears so rarely. In addition, current interpretations of the concept of wu-wei are not well-grounded, at least partly because of the relative lack of textual support. This essay aims to present an organized, systematic, and textually well-grounded account of the meaning of the concept of wu-wei as a Confucian political ideal and demonstrate how it is related to other cardinal values of Confucianism in earlypecific questions: (1) what is the meaning of wu-wei in the context of the political philosophy of Confu China. By carefully exploring and interpreting the Confucian classics, it engages the following scius; (2) as a governing technique, how does wu-wei correlate with other cardinal Confucian values; (3) how does the concept of wu-wei serve as a way to achieve the Confucian political ideal? Speaker 10 Lee, Jeong-In (Sungkyunkwan University) "Friendship and Its Role in Mencius" Abstract This article explores the question of why Mencius 孟子 thought “friendship” (pengyou 朋友) can be one of the most essential relationships in Confucianism. ‘The five relationships’ (wulun 五倫) have often been regarded as the essence of Confucianism. However, while the other four relationships—those between ruler and subject, father and son, husband and wife, and older sibling and younger sibling—concern the family and political world, the last relationship says that ‘Faith should reign over the relation between friends’ (pengyou you xin 朋友有信); it is about friendship. Confucianism centered around family and politics; otherwise, friendship is distinct and it has to be clarified that how “friendship” (pengyou 朋友) can relate to other parts of Confucian teaching. Mencius was who mentioned "friendship" (pengyou 朋友) as one of ‘The five relationships’ (wulun 五倫) for the first time. “Friendship” (pengyou 朋友) in Confucius was the relationship that advises each other and if they are not changed after several times it stopped. So it is focused on the helpful relationship to development. Mencius enlarged the conception of Confucius, making it beyond space, class, and time. The reason is that Mencius expected the social role of “Friendship” (pengyou 朋友) cultivating and verifying “Faith” (xin信). It can be construed as one of the efforts that Mencius showed the possibilities of realizing the Confucian idea in the political world. Speaker 11 Lee, Jong Ui (Sogang University) “Moral Universality in Mengzi and Kant: A Comparison” Abstract In this paper, I would like to examine the concept of universality in Mengzi and Kant’s moral theories, which are found in their works, sometimes explicitly and sometimes by implication. The difference in their styles and the ways in which they present their arguments are obvious. Moreover, they do not share the same terms; some specific terms that are frequently used in one philosopher are not found at all in the other’s works, for example: freedom and autonomy. Although their arguments are couched in different words, they sometimes refer to the same concepts-even occasionally they invoke identical concepts expressed in different words. This raises the possibility that their arguments can be productively compared and further analyzed, insofar as they are working with the same concepts. In this paper, I focus on the concept of moral universality. By moral universality I mean the fact that morality exists in every normal person; strictly speaking this claim applies only to every normal person who is raised in human circumstance without any profound mental or psychological problems. This kind of moral universality is found in both Mengzi and Kant. Mengzi believes that every person can become like King Yao (堯) or Shun (舜) (6B2). Yao and Shun were the legendary emperors of the golden age in Chinese history; they were revered as saints and ideal humans. These royal saints are not that different in their moral capability from normal people because every normal person also shares the same kind of capability to be moral, despite being incomplete presently. Mengzi argues that “All human beings have a mind that cannot bear to see the sufferings of others. The ancient kings had such a commiserating mind and, accordingly, a commiserating government” (2A6). Because of such universality, Mengzi boldly contends that “one who lacks a mind that feels pity and compassion would not be human; one who lacks a mind that feels shame and aversion would not be human; one who lacks a mind that feels modesty and compliance would not be human; and one who lacks a mind that knows right and wrong would not be human” (2A6). Mengzi’s rationale for such moral universality is that if anyone sees a child about to fall into well, one would feel alarm, distress, pity, and compassion for the child (2A6). He explicitly excludes ulterior motives regarding this spontaneous reactive attitude. This compassionate mind is universal to all humans. Kant also argues that morality is found in all rational beings; the moral law is a fact of reason, which is our a priori consciousness of the binding force of the moral law upon each of us (CPrR 5:47). Kant extends moral universality beyond humans to all rational beings, including God and spiritual beings. Kant's categorical imperative, which is the supreme principle of morality, works for all people, and it urges each of us to act by making our personal maxims into universal laws through a sort of thought experiment. As Kant formulates it, “Act only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law” (GMS 4:421) Both Mengzi and Kant promote human dignity which differentiates humans from animals; they propose that the origin of human dignity consists in a moral capability. Mengzi elevates human beings by acknowledging innate good human nature. Kant, also, points out that we humans have innate predispositions (Anlage) and a disposition toward good as native capabilities to be moral. In light of these similarities, I show that Mengzi and Kant are not too far from each other in regard to moral universality, innate good capabilities, and the personal accountability in moral matters, even though the term, freedom, is conspicuously lacking in Mengzi. Speaker 12 Bae, Je-Seong (Sungkyunkwan University) "Two Competitive Models of 'the mind before activation' in Korean Neo Confucian Debate" Abstract In the Song-Ming Neo-Confucian tradition, the “inactivated state of mind” (mibal 未發) was treated as an important theme. Some scholars in the Song Dynasty thought that the inactivated state is a kind of experience or awareness of human moral nature. Some other scholars claimed that the inactivated state refers to the moral essence of the human mind. On the other hand, Zhu Xi asserted that the inactivated mental state is an extremely calm state of mind, and a person in this condition is perfectly moral. How can the quiet state of mind be understood as morally good? First, according to Zhu Xi, in the mibal condition, human moral nature is fully manifested. Second, the state of mibal contains all the potential for good actions and responses. But, can we agree that the mind is perfectly moral just because in this state it is extremely quiet? If someone who was in mibal state did some bad action, can we still accept that the state of mibal was perfectly moral? Some Korean Neo-Confucians in 18th century disputed about such matters. Yi Gan argued that the mind is perfectly pure and moral in the state of mibal. Against Yi, Han Won-Jin held that although the mind in the inactivated state is very silent and clear, it still contains latent tendencies toward good or bad action. Both of these philosophers formalized their arguments within the orthodox principle (li 理) material force (qi 氣) paradigm. Their two views can be understood as competitive models for explaining the mibal state. By looking at these models, I seek to answer the following questions. What did mibal mean to Neo-Confucians? Why was mibal important to Neo-Confucians? Through this study, I expect to gain some significant insights into feature of Neo-Confucian moral cultivation.
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- 작성일 2019-12-04
- 조회수 3116
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- 2nd East Asian Ethics Conference at Sungkyunkwan University (SKKU), April 2020
- 2nd East Asian Ethics Conference Sungkyunkwan University (SKKU), Organized by Doil Kim, Kevin Lam, Tsai Chen-feng, Philip J. Ivanhoe * Event postponed due to outbreak of Corona Virus Time to be announced 1. Scope of East Asian Ethics In connection with the previous conference held at National Taiwan University, this 2ndEast Asian Ethics Conference, at SKKU, will continue to welcome papers on any topic concerning traditional East Asian ethics, especially Taiwan, Japan or Korea. Discussions on these topics are embedded in various traditional texts, such as Confucian or Chinese Buddhist texts and often have arisen in part because of different textual and philosophical interpretations of these texts. And so, the planning committee for this 2nd conference will look forward to receiving papers on textual and historical approaches to traditional East Asian thought, as well as more philosophical approaches. 2. Languages English or Chinese. Korean translations of ppt or the gist of papers may be provided for the audience. 3. Specific themes for the 2nd East Asian Ethics Conference The planning committee will especially welcome papers that explore the possibility that contemporary East Asian ethics can be established or improved based on traditional East Asian thought. In this regard, this conference will be a forum for discussion on the contemporary implications of traditional Confucian and Buddhist thought in contemporary East Asia, such as “What are the implications of traditional Confucian thought in contemporary Korean society?” and “What does the thought of the Kyoto school mean to ethical issues in contemporary Japanese society?” 4. Panels 3-4 speakers each from Korea, Japan, and Taiwan. The time allotted will be 30 mins per paper (20-min presentation and 10-min discussion). This format is comparatively easier to manage and designed to encourage in-depth discussions. Ppt or short (maximum of four page) gists of papers must be received two months prior to the meeting in order to allow time for translation. Our aim is to compile papers presented at the conference into a journal special issue or edited volume. All panelists are self-financed for their round trip travel to Seoul, Korea. The Sungkyun Institute for Confucian Studies and East Asian Philosophy (SICEP) will financially and administratively support this 2nd conference (https://swb.skku.edu/sicep/index.do). 5. Speakers 1. CHANG, Kung-Chiang (National Taiwan Normal University) 2. CHONG, Chaehyun (Sogang University) 3. CHUNG, Chen-Yu (Academic Sinica) 4. GODA, Masato (Meiji University) 5. ISHIHARA, Yuko (Ritsumeikan University) 6. KIM, Doil (Sungkyunkwan University) 7. KIM, Myeong-seok (Yonsei University) 8. LAM, Wing-keung (Dokkyo University) 9. LIU, Lori Kuan-Ling (National Tsing Hua University) 10. PARK, So-Jeong (Sungkyunkwan University) 11. SHINO, Yoshinobu (Meiji University) 12. TAKEHANA, Yosuke (Otani University) 13. TSAI, Chen-Feng (National Taiwan University) 14. TSAI, Miao Kun (National Taiwan University)
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- 작성일 2019-08-05
- 조회수 2616
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- Confucian Literati & their Christian Interlocutors: Dialogues & Debates in East Asia
- [International Conference] Confucian Literati & their Christian Interlocutors: Dialogues & Debates in East Asia (16th-19th Cent.) * Event cancelled due to outbreak of Corona Virus This international conference, to be held on the historic campus of Sungkyunkwan University and jointly sponsored by the Ricci Institute for Chinese-Western Cultural History at the University of San Francisco and the Sungkyun Institute of Confucian Studies and East Asian Philosophy (SICEP), will gather leading scholars from around the world who will present their research and exchange ideas concerning the diverse and complex interactions between Confucianism and Christianity in China, Korea, and Japan during the 16th-19th centuries. Topics to be covered will include but not be restricted to philosophical and theological exchanges, influences, and debates, theoretical and practical impacts on ritual, music, liturgy etc., exchanges between and mutual influences on book/print culture, and political/social/ideological controversies (e.g. the Korean case of Christianity being considered a dangerous “heterodox” interpretation of Confucianism). Partial list of presenters and titles Speaker 1 Halla Kim (Sogang University) kim.halla@hotmail.com Is Taiji (太極) God (Deus)? Matteo Ricci, Joachim Bouvet (白晋 or 白進, 1656 – 1736), and Tasan Chong Yagyong on the Status of Taiji Abstract To be announced Speaker 2 Soh JeanHyoung (Researcher, The Institute for Korean Politics, Seoul National University) jeansoh74@gmail.com The Meaning of 權 and 能 after Matteo Ricci's Tianzhu Shiyi Abstract To be announced Speaker 3 Donald Baker (University of British Columbia) ubcdbaker@gmail.com Catholic Ethical Thinking in a Confucian World Abstract To be announced Speaker 4 Sr. Kim Sunghae, S.C. (Superior General, Sisters of Charity of Seton Hill, USA) skim@scsh.org Confucian and Christian understanding of Timely Mean and Discernment Abstract To be announced Speaker 5 Anh Tran, S.J. (Santa Clara University School of Theology) aqtran@scu.edu Title to be announced Abstract To be announced Speaker 6 Song Gang (University of Hong Kong) songg@hku.hk A True Confucian with a Christian Mind: Zhang Xingyao and Catholic Apologetics in Early Qing China Abstract This paper investigates the syncretic theological and philosophical thinking of Zhang Xingyao 張星曜 (1633-ca. 1715), a third-generation Chinese Catholic convert in early Qing China. It focuses on Zhang’s ambitious plan to establish a composite Christian-Confucian belief system through his voluminous apologetic works, including Tianjiao mingbian 天教明辨 (A Clear Examination of the Christian Doctrines, ca. 1711) and Tian-Ru tongyi kao 天儒同異考 (A Study on the Similarities and Differences between Christianity and Confucianism, 1715). Not only did his writings represent the climax of Chinese Catholic apologetic literature during the late 17th century, but they also became part of the growing controversy on ideological orthodoxy and ritualistic conformity in the early Qing socio-political context. Through in-depth textual and intertextual analysis, the paper aims to uncover the complex formation of Zhang’s thoughts on how to (re)interpret the essential Catholic doctrines, how to rectify the erroneous native religions that deviated from orthodox Confucian teachings, and ultimately, how to live a hybrid spiritual and moral life as a true Confucian with a Christian mind. Speaker 7 Thierry Meynard, S.J. (Sun Yatsen University, Guangzhou) meiqianl@mail.sysu.edu.cn Seventeenth century Jesuits and Confucianism in Vietnam Abstract Jesuits in Japan did not have a deep understanding of Confucianism until João Rodrigues developed a thorough refutation of the man Confucius, of his teaching and of his legacy. Rodrigues brought those ideas to the Jesuit mission in China, challenging the Confucianized Christianity which had been promoted by Matteo Ricci. We shall look here at three missionary accounts of the Jesuit mission in Vietnam, by Cristoforo Borri, Alexandre de Rhodes, and Giovanni Filippo de Marini, tracing the conflicting influences they received from the Japan mission and from the China mission in their understanding of Confucianism. This shall enable us to map out their understanding of the role of Confucianism in Vietnamese culture and society, and the missionary policies they adopted in its regard. Speaker 8 Antton Egiguren Iraola (St. John the Evangelist Cathedral, Boise) egiguren@gmail.com Confucionism, Catholicism, and Moral Perfectionism Abstract To be announced Speaker 9 M. Antoni J. Ucerler, S. J. (University of San Francisco, Ricci Institute) mjucerler@usfca.edu Chinese Christian Books in Edo Japan: Confucian Academies, Censorship, and Circulation Abstract To be announced Speaker 10 Kiri Paramore (University College Cork, National University of Ireland) kiri.paramore@ucc.ie Title to be announced Abstract To be announced Speaker 11 Fr. OH Sae-il, S.J. (Sogang University) ohseilsj@gmail.com Title to be announced Abstract To be announced
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- 작성일 2019-04-24
- 조회수 2489
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- Confucianism, Rituals, and Modern Life
- [International Conference] Confucianism, Rituals, and Modern Life 8-9 November 2019, Sungkyunkwan University, Korea This international conference, to be held on the campus of Sungkyunkwan University, the historic heart of Korean Confucianism, and sponsored by the Sungkyun Institute of Confucian Studies and East Asian Philosophy (SICEP), will gather together leading scholars from around the world who will present their research and exchange ideas concerning the theory and practice of ritual in Confucianism and other major world traditions and their potential for enhancing modern life. The aim of the meeting is to explore traditional Confucian rituals in order to better understand the nature and values of ritual practice and apply such understanding to further appreciate aspects of contemporary life that illustrate the values of ritual, identify examples of modern ritual practice that can be improved by reflecting on traditional forms of ritual, and uncover areas of modern life that lack and can be improved through adopting or adapting traditional forms of ritual. Speaker 1 Michael Puett (Harvard University, Keynote) Ritual and Religion Revisited Abstract The concept of religion has recently become an object of strong critique. As numerous scholars have argued, the very concept comes from a particular reading of a particular tradition, and the attempt to build a field of study based upon such a restricted concept has resulted in, at best, a highly ethnocentric body of knowledge and, at worst, an implicitly imperialistic one. This paper attempts to respond to such critiques by arguing that instead of rejecting the concept, we need to resurrect it by building upon the understandings that emerged in other traditions. More specifically, I will explore the implications of such an approach by re-thinking our understandings of ritual, belief, and religion in general by means of ideas that arose in classical Chinese thought. Speaker 2 Taneli Kukkonen (NYU Abu Dhabi) Ritual in Islam according to Al-Ghazālī Abstract The academic study of Islamic ritual has largely focused on the present day and on empirical observation--that is to say, on anthropological fieldwork. This concentration on the external and the descriptive (as opposed to the internal and the prescriptive) is understandable, seeing as what Muslim authors themselves say about the various 'acts of worship' looks very different from the characterizations of ritual put forward by key 20th-century theorists of religion. In my talk, I examine what a leading Muslim scholar, Abu Hamid al-Ghazali (1056-1111) has to say about worship and its inner and outer dimensions. Al-Ghazali's theory of ritual is shown to be nuanced and distinctive, in how it links Greek theories of psychology and physiology to Muslim notions of character formation. Speaker 3 So Jeong Park (Sungkyunkwan University) “Ritual and Music” Revisited Abstract Anyone who understands Confucianism will notice that ritual is the central theme, but not many people properly draw attention to the fact that ritual and music are inseparable, and that music carries more weight than ritual. When music is discussed as a subject of Confucian philosophy, it is often misrepresented as merely an aid to help the ritual proceed in harmony. However, Confucius’ reflection on music was at the heart of innovation that made it possible to transform his ideas from the guardian of the Zhou ritual to the general philosophy of culture and politics. In this regard, music must be considered when attempting to bring relevancy to the Confucian ritual into today’s context. The purpose of this paper is to reexamine “ritual/music (禮樂 lǐyuè),” conceived as indispensable complements each of the other and coined as a single compound term by Confucius. A review of pre-Confucius traditions reveals that the concept of “ritual/music (禮樂 lǐyuè)” was not identified in the ancient Zhou ritual system, but the product of Confucius’ philosophical work that reinterpreted the political and cultural structures of the Zhou. Thus, Confucius’ acknowledgement of “lǐyuè” should not be understood simply as an emphasis of “ceremonial music” or “musical accompaniment to rites” but as a proposal of Confucian political philosophy. Confucius not only placed music on an equal ground to ritual in the process of conceptualizing “lǐyuè”, but affirmed it as essential for the completion of moral character and the fulfillment of social order by including it in the fundamental curriculum. In this sense, music is more important than ritual in Confucianism. A proper understanding of “lǐyuè” will help you understand Confucius’ intention in saying “moral completion through music,” and why his critics such as Mozi and Zhuangzi made “lǐyuè” the main target. Speaker 4 Geir Sigurðsson (University of Iceland) Can Ritual Be Modern? Liquid Modernity, Social Acceleration and ‘Litual’ Abstract 1. The Present Condition Here I will outline the main ideas presented by two critics of late modernity, namely Zygmunt Bauman’s ‘liquid modernity’ and Hartmut Rosa’s ‘social acceleration’. Their analyses, which I consider mutually resonating, highlight some problematic features of late modernity, which most certainly find themselves in tension with anything resembling rituals or ritualistic behavior. 2. The Use and Abuse of Ritual In this part, I will discuss some predominantly anti-globalizing tendencies in contemporary Europe that appear to stimulate a ritual resurgence, but, as I will argue, rather represent an exclusivist, nationalist and reactionary aspect of ritual, one that exemplifies the pejorative side of ritualism. 3. Reformulating Ritual as Confucian ‘Litual’ According to my interpretation of the ancient Confucian approach to li 禮, which encompasses what is usually understood as ‘ritual’ in a Western context, it is supposed to be flexible, accord with both time and circumstances, and its practitioners are responsible for its constant adaptation to new circumstances. I venture to call this ancient (predominantly pre-Qin) version of ritual ‘litual’. 4. Reintroducing a Neo-Daoist Approach to Confucian Ritual? If there is enough time, I would like to briefly address the Neo-Daoist reading of Confucianism, especially as presented by Wang Bi in the Wei-Jin period. I believe that this reading, based on the ineffability of morality, reinforces the flexible interpretation that I provide in part 3. 5. Conclusions To conclude, I want to suggest that a different understanding of ritual as ‘litual’, i.e. as li-inspired ritual, a flexible, adaptable, ‘creative and individualistic’, even critical kind of ritual, may not only stand a chance up against liquid modernity and social acceleration, but may even alleviate some of their more harmful effects. Speaker 5 Anna Sun (Kenyon College) Global Confucian Rites in the 21st Century Abstract This paper examines global Confucianism in the 21st century. Confucianism has long had a strong hold in East Asia, leaving distinct legacies in China, Korea, and Japan. It has also had significant impact in Southeast Asia, especially in Vietnam, Singapore, Indonesia, and Malaysia. In the 21st century, we see further developments of Confucianism in different regions of the world, especially with the greater mobility of people who now carry Confucianism with them as a treasured system of ethics, rituals, and subjective meaning. It does not come as a surprise that today we see a great variety of Confucian rituals in this global context. Here I focus on two forms of Confucian rituals: rites for Confucius and rites for ancestral spirits. My comparative analysis is based on ethnographic fieldwork conducted in the following countries and regions from 2008 to 2018: Mainland China, Taiwan, South Korea, Japan, Indonesia, and the United States. I suggest that contemporary Confucianism is a case of the increasing transformation of implicit religious identity into explicit religious identity in the development of transnational and global religious life. Speaker 6 Hwa Yeong Wang (Sungkyunkwan University) Rituals for Women in Korean Confucianism -Focusing on Uam Song Siyŏl- Abstract This paper examines rituals for women in Korean Confucianism with a special focus on Song Siyŏl (宋時烈, 1607-1689), pen name Uam (尤庵). Confucian ritual propriety (ye 禮) connects past and present, appropriates communication between people, and provides foundation of social and political systems and practices. From the beginning of modern era, however, feminist scholars criticized Confucianism for its texts offered male-centered ritual and social institutes. Ritual propriety has been harshly criticized reproducing and stimulating gender inequality based on its male-centered ideal. Contemporary Confucian philosophers seemed to leave the historical baggage to ritual propriety that is expressed and changed according to time and space and that is subject to human misinterpretation or malpractices. Ritual propriety was rejected for being a vehicle or expression of its male-centered philosophy by both feminist and Confucian philosophers. The debates over humaneness(in) and ritual propriety revealed the need of re-examination of the meaning and position of ritual propriety within Confucian philosophy and the need of feminist approach that brings women’s lived experience into the discussion of ritual propriety. The paper argues that Korean neo-Confucianism in the seventeenth century provides an invaluable insight for its unique interest and development of ritual learning (yehak 禮學). The ritual learning influenced not only on metaphysical world but also everyday life. Uam Song Siyŏl is a representative Confucian philosopher of the time. He succeeded the understanding of Kiho School and stressed actualization of righteous principles in reality. Uam also wrote sizable writings on women. Analysis of the philosophizing process of Uam’s understanding, appropriating and recreating of family rituals related to women will provide a way to imagine a feminist future of Confucian ritual propriety. Speaker 7 Colin Lewis (University of Colorado at Colorado Springs) Xunzi's Ritual Model and Modern Moral Education Abstract While the early Confucians were largely content to maintain the rituals of ancient kings as the core of moral education in their time, it is not obvious that contemporary humans could, or should, draw from the particulars of such a tradition. This essay examines impediments faced by a ritualized approach to moral education, how they might be overcome, and how a ritual method could be developed in modernity. I contend that a Confucian notion of ritual is both compatible with modern moral education and capable of making a distinct contribution, particularly in terms of how rituals can be used to structure and inculcate a shared climate of respect. Speaker 8 Soon-ja Yang (Chonnam University) Harmony through Ritual and Music in the Xunzi: Between Distancing and Closeness Abstract Xunzi believed that Confucian rituals (li 禮) provided a guideline for people to maintain a harmonious relationship with others and, at the same time, maintain a proper distance from them. People can live in peace by accepting the rituals, which distinguish them according to age, sex, ability, and so on. Xunzi’s rule of rituals emphasizes differences among people and distributes their status and roles according to such differences. Integration through rituals is achieved by individuals having a common belief in morality or religion. However, it is challenging for people to share common beliefs about a certain symbol. This is because the relationship between signifier and signified is unstable, and accordingly the signified lends itself to various interpretations. The process of one’s generating “meaning” is a thoroughly personal undertaking, and is closed to others. In my opinion, Xunzi’s concept of music can be viewed as a key to reducing the instability of communication by means of language. Communication through music is not linguistic, but non-propositional and non-conceptual. The interaction that occurs during rituals takes place not simply through language but through a holistic experience involving hearing, vision, touch, smell and so on. Harmony through music in Xunzi’s view can be understood by Randall Collins's “physical copresence,” “emotional entrainment,” and “collective effervescence.” Most emotional confluence depends on the physical coexistence of the participants in the rituals. When people are physically present together, they can more easily identify the signals and physical expressions that emanate from each other. By sharing the rhythm of catching up with each other's movements and emotions and focusing on a common locus of attention, they can reach a state of intersubjectivity. There also occurs a breakdown in the boundaries between “self” and “other” among those who share physical rhythms while listening to music in the same space. This can be explained by what Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi calls “flow.” When we are in the flow state, our thoughts, intentions, feelings, and all other senses are focused on one purpose. Focusing on the purpose allows us to enjoy the action itself, not its implications for other external ends. This autotelic action gives us a feeling of joy. One phenomenon seen in people who are in a state of joy is a loss of self-consciousness. By immersing all our psychological energy in an activity, we become part of a much larger system of activity. This breaking of boundaries allows us to feel a sense of community, even when we do not share any beliefs or concepts with each other. This is the “unifying what is common to us (hetong同)” described by Xunzi in my view. In the process of enacting rituals, dance helps us feel the flow state best, providing a stronger source for emotional bonds. The fact that people share emotions through music, and thus break down the boundaries between themselves and others, does not guarantee that a common moral belief system will be formed between them. Nonetheless, although participants in a ritual interpret the symbols used in the ritual in different ways, they can feel united with others simply by joining in the same action and moving in rhythm with them. People who share this type of experience are more likely to form a common belief system. Therefore, harmony through music based on human commonality (tong 同) is a source for harmony through rituals based on their differences (fen 分) in status, age, gender, capabilities, and so on. Speaker 9 Eric L. Hutton (University of Utah) On Ritual and Legislation Abstract The Confucian tradition holds that its rituals were established by sages in the past. Focusing on that idea of the sage as a great designer of rituals, this paper engages in a comparison and contrast between the sage and a similar figure, namely the great legislator. By thinking through some of the challenges faced by lawmakers and the virtues that help them legislate well, we gain a better appreciation for what is so special about sages in Confucian thought, as well as an enhanced appreciation for good legislators. The paper ends by using the difference between legislating and designing rituals to highlight a set of challenges faced by those who would advocate designing new rituals to meet the demands of our modern age.
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- 작성일 2019-03-21
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- Confucianism, Buddhism, and Kantian Moral Theory
- The Schedule has been changed. Please check the attached file above. [International Conference] Confucianism, Buddhism, and Kantian Moral Theory 6-7 September 2019, Sungkyunkwan University, Korea The project explores contemporary trends in moral theory by bringing together influential and promising philosophers, East and West, who work at the intersection between Confucian, Buddhist, and Kantian moral theory. The goal is for them not only to share their views, but also to meet, listen to, and exchange ideas and arguments with one another with the aim of fostering a greater global perspective, deeper and more productive intercultural exchange, and future collaboration. The invited philosophers represent a geographically diverse group as well as a variety of interests and points of view. They all, though, are trained in and share the approach of analytic philosophy, which, it is hoped, will help to shed light upon the traditions, themes, and problems that serve as the theme of this meeting. Speaker 1 Brad Cokelet (University of Kansas) bradcokelet@gmail.com Unconditionally Good Practical Wisdom Abstract In the Groundwork, Kant begins by arguing that the good will is an unconditioned good. He also seems to hold that the good will is the only unconditioned good. In rejecting alternatives, he discusses various virtues but, surprisingly, does not discuss practical wisdom. In this paper, I argue that practical wisdom is an unconditional good and that the goodness of the good will is actually a function of the agent’s practical wisdom. In part one, I distinguish some different conceptions of practical wisdom that are found in the ancient western and eastern philosophic traditions, and pick out a broadly neo-Confucian conception. In part two, I clarify Kant’s conception of an unconditioned good and his accounts of the good will and virtue. In part three, I clarify Kant's arguments for the unconditioned goodness of the good will and consider an additional argument we can construct on his behalf, by appeal to other parts of his work. Finally, in part four, I argue that practical wisdom is an unconditioned good and that the degree of goodness of a good will is a function of the agent’s degree of practical wisdom. Speaker 2 Justin Tiwald (San Francisco State University) jtiwald@sfsu.edu Dai Zhen on Morality, Relationships, and Shared Ends Abstract Relationships of a certain ethically meaningful kind, including those between family and close friends, are sometimes seen as requiring co-constitutively shared ends – that is, aims or interests that are in some way responsive to the needs and concerns of the people related to one another and not reducible to interests that they would have had independently of the relationship. Paradigmatic examples of shared ends include such things as raising children, joint hobbies, shared social causes, and joint commitments to the health and longevity of the relationships themselves. In my paper, I examine a Confucian philosopher who has sophisticated but somewhat implicit views about the ethical importance and function of shared ends: Dai Zhen 戴震. Dai suggests that the role of the shared ends will vary significantly depending on the kind of relationship under consideration, relying to different degrees on certain virtues such as trust (xin 信) and benevolence (ren 仁) to instantiate them. Shared ends importantly account for the distinctive sort of attachment that Confucians believe we should have to those who are near and dear to us, which in turn has implications for Buddhist ideals of non-attachment, the Kantian ideal of practical (and not pathological) love, and the Aristotelian notion of a friend as “another self.” My paper notes some of these implications but will focus in particular on how Dai’s view poses challenges to notions of love, attachment, and human relationships presupposed by a Kantian moral framework. Speaker 3 Minghuei Lee (Distinguished Research Fellow Institute of Chinese Literature and Philosophy, Academia Sinica) lmhuei@hotmail.com Wang Yangming’s Doctrine of the Unity of Knowing and Acting in the Light of Kant’s Practical Philosophy Abstract Wang Yangming’s doctrine of the “unity of moral knowledge and action” (zhi xing heyi 知行合一) can be traced back to Mencius’ theory of “original knowing” (liangzhi 良知). Similarly, Kant has discussed the relationships of theory to practice on three different levels (morality, law of state, and international law) in his article, “On the Common Saying: ‘This May be True in Theory, but it does not Apply in Practice’.” He proposed the unity of theory and practice in moral philosophy. So in the light of Kant’s doctrine of theory and practice, I interpret Wang’s doctrine of the “unity of moral knowledge and action” with a view to clarifying some misinterpretations of it. Thereby, I demonstrate that this doctrine is logically interconnected with Wang’s other two doctrines, namely the doctrine ofthe “identity of heart/mind and principle” (xin ji li 心即理）and that of “extension of original knowing” (zhiliangzhi 致良知), although these three doctrines were advanced by him in different times. Speaker 4 Christian Wenzel (National Taiwan University) wenzelchristian@yahoo.com Determinism, Rigorism, and Hope in Kant Abstract Early on, Kant had been influenced by Newton and the natural sciences as well as by Crusius and theological debates. Throughout his life he held on to ideas of physical determinism, even stronger than Newton did, and he also followed Crusius in his demand for absolute freedom. But different from Crusisus, who at places reads like an existentialist, he demanded explanations for free moral actions. Thus arose a strong tension between free will and determinism for Kant. It led to his transcendental philosophy in which he tried to dissolve this tension. Kant cannot be classified as either a compatibilist or an incompatibilist in the current terminology of analytic philosophy. Kant is an idealist basing his philosophy on the notion of Vorstellung (representation) and his views are fundamentally different. His moral philosophy appears to be rule-governed, demanding, and radical, including the idea of radical evil. His demand for free will shows in what he calls “Gesinnungswandel.” But I think this so-called “rigorism” is not as strong as is often depicted. I think there is room for what I would call “maxims ad hominem,” even in the face of demands of universality. I will demonstrate this by focusing on a neglected passage from the Groundwork. No matter whether derterminism is true or not, there are good reasons not to be a fatalist but to keep hope and moral standards high. One reason arises from the Stoic Chrysippus’ insight into the idea of co-fatedness. Even if determinism is true, efforts make a difference. The other reason is that we simply cannot live without hope and morality, and I think Kant was keenly aware of this point. Kant built on the Stoic philosophy of paying attention to what is “inner” and “up to us” by including the idea of a “realm of ends” in the light of which we should read history with a cosmopolitan aim. This shows demand as well as a hope. Speaker 5 David Cummiskey (Bates College) dcummisk@bates.edu Buddhist and Kantian Conceptions of Self-Constitution Abstract Buddhists need a conception of a minimal self to account for the karmic-continuity of persons and also to provide an adequate account of the subjectivity of experience. More specifically, I argue that we should reject reductionist views, which argue that the idea of the self is a mere fiction that is reducible to its simpler and more basic parts. Although the reductionist view is emphasized in most discussions of Buddhist philosophy, there has always been a lively internal debate about reductionist accounts of memory, the seeming continuity of subjectivity, and the concept of a person. In particular, early Buddhists traditions included the Personalist who insisted that karmic continuity and responsibility presuppose some conception of a continuous subject. More recently, a host of Buddhist philosophers, including Evan Thomson (2007, 2011), Matthew MacKenzie (2011), and Georges Dreyfus (2011), have argued that the core doctrine of no-self is consistent with a minimal, non-substantial, and emergent view of the self. The current Buddhist debate about the nature of the self is remarkably similar to the Parfit-Korsgaard debate about personal identity and self-constitution. Derek Parfit (1984) also argues that there is no deep metaphysical self and that relations of personal identity are reducible to a series of experiences and relations of psychological connectedness and causal continuity. Christine Korsgaard (1989, 1996, 2009) responded to Parfit’s reductionist view by developing a non-metaphysical account of Kantian agency and self-constitution. I argue that Korsgaard’s objections to Parfit also apply to the Buddhist reductionist view, but are remarkably similar to the Buddhist minimalist arguments. On the other hand, although her objections to reductionism may be sound, Korsgaard also argues for a Kantian conception of an autonomous and independent self. The Buddhist minimalist view rejects the idea that we are independent autonomous agents. Korsgaard’s argument focuses on agency and self-constitution and that is also my focus. I argue that the Buddhist minimalist view provides a plausible alternative to her Kantian account of self-constitution. The Buddhist alternative rejects the idea of the autonomous subject over and above its ends, and argues instead that the process of self-constitution is thoroughly embedded in a web of dependent origination. For Buddhists, the conception of oneself as independent and autonomous is instead part of the “primal confusion” that projects a reified subject-other division on experience. This confusion is the source of existential suffering, anxiety and stress, which characterizes too much of the human condition. Instead of the concept of the independent autonomous self, Buddhists embrace a non-egocentric perfectionist ideal, which includes a fundamental reorientation and re-constitution of the self. Speaker 6 Kyla Ebels-Duggan (Northwestern University) kebelsduggan@northwestern.edu Love, Respect and the Value of Humanity Abstract In this paper, I join a small but growing group of contemporary moral philosophers who argue that, rather than competing with moral obligation, love for individuals is related to moral commitment in more positive ways. I argue for three such connections: First, love gives us insight into the value of individuals, or the content of the concept of the value of humanity, a concept that figures centrally in Kantian moral theory among others. Second, I argue that interpersonal love and moral commitment share important structural features. Each involves a normative commitment that we have sufficient justifying reason for but cannot reason to. Because of this, though our own commitments are warranted, in neither case can we construct arguments by which we could convince a skeptical third party to come to share these commitments. Love is more obviously like this than moral commitment, so reflection on the case of love can illuminate the standing of, and appropriate attitude toward, moral skepticism. Third, love nevertheless provides conceptual materials for a kind of argument to moral commitment, the requirement to value each individual that Kant expresses in his principle that we must always treat humanity as an end in itself. Speaker 7 Karen Stohr (Georgetown University) kes39@georgetown.edu Straightening Crooked Wood: Xunzi and Kant on Moral Improvement Abstract This paper compares Xunzi’s account of self-cultivation with Kant’s account of moral improvement, with an eye toward the implications of those accounts for contemporary ethical theory. I draw parallels between Xunzi’s picture of the transformative effects of ritual and Kant’s remarks on importance of social graces for improving our moral characters and creating what he calls a “beautiful illusion” of morality in a flawed world. I argue that Xunzi and Kant are right to direct our attention to the crucial role that social practices play in the moral improvement of our individual character. Although the kinds of rituals and conventions that so interested Xunzi and Kant are largely ignored in contemporary western ethical theory, I argue that this is a mistake. Insofar as ethical theory concerns itself with moral improvement, it ought to pay much closer attention to the ways in which specific social practices play a role in straightening the bent wood of humanity. Speaker 8 Nicholas Bunnin (Oxford University) nick.bunnin@chinese.ox.ac.uk A Moral Metaphysics and a Metaphysics of Morality: Xunzi and Kant Abstract I compare Xunzi’s method of overcoming the obsessions leading to partial knowledge with Kant’s transcendental doctrine of method and its extension to the cluster of methods he employed to comprehend ourselves and our institutions as open to ethical judgement. The upshot is that in both cases a metaphysics allowing for our humanity must allow for morality, specifically in terms of the human dao and its exemplification in rites for Xunzi and in terms of humanity in oneself and others as an end in itself for Kant. I will deal with puzzles concerning both of these approaches to metaphysics and their relations to Xunzi and Kant’s conceptions of nature, the self, virtue, moral psychology, agency and practical reason. My conclusion will reflect on what we can learn from thinking about Xunzi and Kant together. Speaker 9 Carol Rovane (Columbia University) cr260@columbia.edu Self-Constitution Without Kantian Moral Implications Abstract The very idea of self-constitution seems paradoxical: How can a self constitute itself unless it is already there to do the constituting? This appearance might lead us to suppose that talk of self-constitution cannot be taken entirely literally – that what gets constituted is a kind of unity whose first and natural site would be a metaphysically given condition, such as a human life. I argue that this appearance is entirely misleading and, correlatively, that talk of self-constitution can and should be taken literally. When we do, we must allow that wherever the unity that is characteristic of individual rational agency is constituted, there we find a person; and this can happen within boundaries narrower than a single life, so as to constitute multiple persons within it, and wider than a single life, so as to constitute group persons spanning many human lives. This metaphysics of the self does not afford the sorts of Kantian moral implications for which Christine Korsgaard has argued, because it can be situated in a metaphysics of value that denies categorical force to any and all values, including the constitutive normative demands of rationality, as well as moral demands. Speaker 10 Halla Kim (Sogang University) hallakim@unomaha.edu Kant and the Fate of the Four-Seven Debate Abstract In this talk, I reinterpret the well-known Four-Seven Debate of the middle Joseon dynasty in Korea in the language of Kant (1724-1840) and employ the latter’s autonomist moral theory to shed light on the debate. In his original position, Yi Hwang 李滉 (Toegye 退溪, 1501-1571) connects the Four Sprouts (四端) with pattern-principle (li 理) and the moral mind-heart, while he connects the Seven feelings (七情) with gi (氣) and the human mind-heart. He thus seems to maintain the ontological separation of the Four and Seven, even though they are phenomenologically inseparable. In a nutshell, for Toegye, the Four issue from li while the Seven issue from gi (理氣分屬). This view resembles some leading aspects of Kant’s moral theory. For example, the Four may be compared to the moral, rational feeling based on reason described in the Groundwork, and Critique of Practical Reason, while the Seven can be viewed as originating from desire. Toegye’s li thus functions much in the same way as Kant’s reason (Vernunft) as it is what makes possible the materialization of ethical ideals. Indeed for Toegye, li can act by itself; li issues (理發) on its own; it moves (理動) and comes into being of itself (理自到). In other words, li is the autonomist source of moral motivation. Similarly, Kant holds that reason alone can give rise to the good will, i.e., morality. Speaker 11 Jennifer Lockhart (Auburn University) jrl0027@auburn.edu Impotence and Competing Principles: Two Practical Arguments for Postulating God’s Existence Abstract This paper presents two versions of Kant’s practical argument for postulating God’s existence and argues that the second, nonstandard, version of the argument is stronger than the first. Kant claims that practical reason’s deployment of the concept of the highest good leads to an apparent conflict of reason with itself. One standard interpretation of the antimony (Impotence) involves the idea that it is impossible to pursue the highest good because we aren’t powerful enough to guarantee that we can bring this end about. I argue that this is not a successful argument for postulating God’s existence because practical reason plausibly requires only that we strive to attain the highest good, in the sense of doing whatever we can to bring it about, however little that is. There is no reason to suppose that practical reason requires us to be powerful enough to actually attain the highest good. I propose a second interpretation of the antimony (Competing Principles) that presents the apparent conflict of reason as considerably less tractable. On this view, practical reason demands that one act according to two principles, each of which seems to require something different. On this view, the problem isn’t that we can do so little towards the end of the highest good, but that anything we do towards this end is compromised because it seems to contravene other deontic (in the sense of non-teleological) requirements of practical reason. In light of Competing Principles, we must postulate the existence of God in order to guarantee that the two principles of practical reason—the teleological and the deontic—do not compete but instead harmonize with one another. Competing Principles allows for a stronger practical argument for God’s existence.
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- 작성일 2019-03-21
- 조회수 3881
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