

1 Introduction

Why Confucian Sentimental Representation?

Political Representation in East Asian society

Although there has been controversy over the genuine meaning of democracy and ways of realizing it among political theorists, it seems clear that ‘democracy’ is universally regarded as the most ideal and favored political system by a large majority of the citizenry in East Asia. One distinctive feature of contemporary East Asian societies is that, notwithstanding their strong support for democracy as the best form of government, they understand democracy differently than Western societies do.¹ Accordingly, many scholars have sought to explain East Asian citizens’ perception of democracy with reference to the idea of Confucian virtue politics that has profoundly influenced socio-political practices and institutions in East Asia for a long time, particularly focusing on the Confucian idea of benevolent government run by a virtuous and talented leader. For example, according to Doh Chull Shin’s empirical study based on the Asian Barometer Survey, although citizens in democratic society are significantly less supportive of paternalism, people in non-democratic countries such as China, Vietnam, and Singapore still endorse or remain attached to the idea of paternalism.²

What is intriguing is that although the authoritarian-style government based on paternalism is less supported in democratic societies such as South Korea (hereafter Korea) and Taiwan, 75.0 percent of Taiwanese citizens and 56.1 percent of Korean citizens responded that ‘the relationship between the government and the people should be like that between parents and children’. In addition, 32.8 percent of Taiwanese citizens and 62.3 percent of Korean citizens positively responded to the statement as follows: ‘if we have political leaders who are morally upright, we can let them decide everything’ (Shin 2012). From these empirical findings, we can infer that even citizens in democratic society under the process of democratic consolidation such as Taiwan or Korea still have distinctively Confucian conceptions of a political relationship between a political leader and ordinary citizens, as well as a political leader’s accountability and political legitimacy, which together give rise to a different mode of political representation.

More interestingly, what draws my attention is that a recent political event in Korea shows how Confucian values and ideas are still affecting the principles of representative government that are formally predicated on liberal democratic

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principles. Over the past three decades, Korea's political system has successfully achieved basic conditions for the settlement and deepening of procedural democracy: protection of basic freedoms as constitutional rights, fair and periodic elections, the peaceful transfer of power between political parties, and a vibrant civil society. Despite a remarkable progress of the liberal democratic political system, however, it is often noted that the moral ground for the political judgment of Korean citizens is difficult to explain with reference to 'interest politics' or 'deliberative politics', two of the most salient normative standards for political judgment in Western political philosophy. Instead, Korean citizens' judgments regarding political legitimacy still appear to rely far more on an affective but critical evaluation of both the political outcomes brought about by political leaders and, sometimes more significantly, their 'proper conduct' in the political arena whose core constitutive elements can be reasonably attributed to Confucian values and mores. Although many studies have been produced on the affective dimension of citizen movement and elite politics in Korean civil society, a thorough philosophical investigation has not clarified the implications of the citizenry's affective judgment for political leadership, especially in relation to political leaders' proper conduct.³ In fact, many scholars, especially those trained in Western political philosophy and political science, have raised serious skepticism about whether affective sentiments can be reconstructed as a normative ground by which to evaluate the legitimacy of political authority given their difficulty in attaining an impartial moral stance, one of the core values of modern rationalism. Not surprisingly, therefore, citizens' affective moral evaluation on the political leader's proper conduct has been widely regarded in political theory as irrational, unrefined, and myopic public sentiments. Nevertheless, it seems to be hardly deniable that, as evidenced by the recent impeachment of President Park Geun-hye in Korea, affective moral judgment shared by ordinary citizens, legislators, and constitutional judges, although one might find it to be particularistic, biased, or irrational, is one of the defining features of Korean democracy.

On March 11, 2017, issuing a unanimous 8–0 ruling upholding the Korean Assembly's December 2016 vote to impeach, the Korean Constitutional Court (KCC) says:

The question of whether to remove the President from office when he or she has violated the law should be determined by whether this violation is of such gravity in terms of protecting the Constitution, that it is required to preserve the Constitution and restore the impaired constitutional order through a decision in favor of removal; or *whether the President, through a violation of law, has betrayed the trust of the people* to such an extent that said public trust vested in the President should be forfeited before the presidential term ends.⁴
(2016Hun-Na1; emphasis added)

Noteworthy in this ruling is the reason why the KCC decided to remove President Park from office: she had lost 'the trust of the people', which is the most important political good in Confucian virtue politics.⁵ Can this expression be crucial

evidence of Confucian civil society or Confucian affective judgment? While attributing this expression to the Confucian tradition, Shin and Moon explicate it as follows:

Many citizens expressed feelings not only of disappointment and betrayal, but also of embarrassment and shame when they heard the charges against President Park. Those who had voted for her in the last election wondered if this was the country in which they had taken such pride owing to its rapid achievement of economic development and political democracy. To them, Park's misbehavior represented a retreat back toward the authoritarian years and a rejection of the democratic principles that they had fought so hard to establish. ... (As a result) the president had lost 'the mandate of heaven'. This ancient concept has roots in imperial China and was later adopted by the Chosun Dynasty (1392–1897), the last and longest-lived Confucian dynasty to rule the Korean Peninsula. Whether the mandate is lost depends on the virtue of the emperor; if he does not fulfill his obligations as emperor, then he loses the mandate and with it the right to continue ruling.

(Shin and Moon 2017: 121; 'As a result' added)

Although this explanation provides us with a detailed description of Korean citizens' main concern in the period of the impeachment of President Park and an important clue to the conceptualization of Confucian political representation, it poses two critical problems. First, it is unclear in what sense ordinary citizens' feelings of disappointment and shame about President Park's wrongdoing can be captured by the Confucian conception of political legitimacy. According to their interpretation, the main reason why ordinary citizens had withdrawn their support for President Park was serious concern about her misbehavior, which represented 'a retreat back toward the authoritarian years and a rejection of the democratic principles that they had fought so hard to establish'. The problem with this interpretation is that it is not clear that the concern about the violation of democratic values such as popular sovereignty, the right to political participation, and basic human rights can be understood as a valid reason for the loss of the Mandate of Heaven in the Confucian tradition.

Second, this explanation does not properly describe why even ardent supporters of President Park withdrew their support. Korean politics has long been dominated by two main conflicting camps. One is the progressive camp, representing the values of substantive democracy, socio-economic equality, and peaceful engagement with North Korea. The other is the conservative camp, representing the values of economic growth, national security, anti-Communism, and a hard-line stance on North Korea. President Park, the daughter of Park Junghee—the military dictator and icon of Korean conservatism who ruled Korea from 1963 until his assassination in 1979 by Kim Jae-gyu, the director of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency—had benefited from the conservatives' nostalgia for her father during her entire political career. Many supporters voted for her believing that she represented and would restore the conservative values mentioned above. Just over half (51.6 percent) of those who voted for President Park in 2012

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agreed with her impeachment five years later. For perhaps different reasons, just under half (48 percent) of the supporters of Moon Jae-in, the 2012 Democratic Party presidential candidate, agreed with her impeachment. It is widely accepted that the Choi Soon-sil scandal was what propelled ordinary Korean citizens to take part in the Candlelight movement, which eventually led to the impeachment of the sitting president.⁶ Yet it is still unclear whether ordinary citizens saw Park's corruption as a moral problem, or took a more pragmatic view on which the essence of the president's wrongdoing was unjust intervention in the free market. This latter interpretation is supported by the fact that one of reasons for the impeachment was the president's violation of the freedom and property rights of enterprises.⁷ In other words, the expression 'the trust of the people' might be only a conventional expression of disappointment at a political leader's wrongdoing, and might not bear on whether he/she has failed to fulfill political responsibility required of political leaders in the Confucian tradition. Therefore, in order for this case to be explained with reference to the Confucian tradition, we need to more carefully focus on why millions of Korean citizens took to the streets and participated in massive protests against the Park Gyen-hye government, and in what sense their moral motivation can be captured from a Confucian perspective. To this end, this study focuses on Park's lack of basic moral abilities as well as her lack of political competence—clearly revealed in the *Sewol* ferry incident.⁸

As noted above, it is undeniable that the Choi Soon-sil scandal was what propelled ordinary Korean citizens to participate in the Candlelight movement. And, the KCC acknowledged Choi's illegal meddling in state affairs through her private connection with the president as the only legally valid ground for Park's impeachment. What is casually dismissed, however, is that the Korean public's negative evaluation of her and the conviction that she was utterly unsuitable for the nation's highest leadership position dramatically increased when she failed to show up for as long as seven hours during the 'Sewol ferry incident'. Watching this tragedy on live broadcast and dumbfounded by the sudden disappearance of the nation's highest political leader, Koreans concurred that the president's failed leadership had exacerbated this national crisis. Nan Kim supports this view:

Park's handling of the disaster was the beginning of her own political demise because it hardened the determination of a wider public to hold Park and her administration accountable for their incompetence, which was exemplified by the Sewol crisis while also reflected in several other highly contentious controversies.

(Kim 2017: 7)

What is important in the present context is that Park's failure to care sincerely about the deep sorrow and anger of ordinary citizens, and the victims' families in particular, made the situation much worse. Even after the *Sewol* incident, Park expressed no proper sympathetic emotion toward the victims' families and instead constantly interfered with the public investigation of the cause of the incident. Her refusal to take responsibility for the *Sewol* incident was a critical reason for Korean

citizens to demand her formal impeachment by the National Assembly. More tellingly, while ruling that ‘this reason (her negligence in the *Sewol* ferry incident) alone is not a sufficient ground to remove the respondent (President Park) from office’, two judges presented the following opinion requiring her what I shall call *affective accountability*:

A true leader of a nation should swiftly ascertain the situation when a national crisis strikes; minimize damage by taking appropriate measures under changing circumstances; *share the suffering of the victims and their families; and give the citizens hope that such dark times will not last*. Of course, it cannot be said that the President violated the duty of fidelity for failing to live up to the model of a true leader. Nonetheless, the people require the leadership of the top commander of state affairs the most, not in conventional and ordinary situations when the government system runs smoothly, but when a national crisis such as war or a large-scale disaster occurs and the situation moves rapidly in an unpredictable direction, and when the government system that should control and manage such a crisis fails to run properly. Such a crisis occurred on April 16, 2014, the day of the *Sewol* ferry tragedy.⁹

(2016Hun-Na1; emphasis added)

As is well described in the statement above, it is still debatable whether the lack of affective accountability can be a single valid reason for Park’s impeachment. Yet, it seems clear that even the KCC attempted to find adequate moral language to chastise President Park for her lack of affective accountability; Korean civil and political society expected President Park, as the highest political leader, to show a sympathetic heart and sincere attitude toward the well-being of the people and withdrew their support when she betrayed their moral expectations.¹⁰ In other words, the reason why she lost the trust of the people was not just because the Park Geun-hye government lacked political competence or failed to save the victims, owing to President Park’s misjudgments, but because she lacked basic moral virtues required of a political leader.

It is at this juncture that this book begins with a view to building a new theory about political representation: could President Park have avoided impeachment if she had successfully engaged with ordinary citizens and the victims’ families in an affective and emotionally proper manner *even though she failed to save the victims*? Put differently, what was the moral ground on which Korean citizens and the constitutional judges found that the president’s lack of *affective accountability* was the critical defect in her political legitimacy? If it is possible to capture this unique mode of political representation in terms of *sentimentalist representation*, can we articulate its mode and operation with reference to Confucianism that has profoundly influenced the formation of political ideology and moral sentiments in East Asia? Is it worth pursuing the model given that the political judgments it produces does not facilitate interest politics or deliberative politics as understood in Western liberal politics? How can Confucian sentimental representation contribute to the recent debate on Confucian meritocracy and Confucian democracy?

To answer these questions, this book theorizes political representation by deriving its moral and theoretical foundation from the idea of Confucian virtue politics.

Political Representation in Western Political Philosophy

Let us recapitulate what I have discussed so far. According to the empirical findings based on the ABS survey and my interpretation of the Korean impeachment case, political representation in East Asia can be characterized by the key Confucian values and ideas; moreover, such Confucian values and ideas have still a normative force in East Asian society when citizens, legislatures, and constitutional judges decide whether their representative government can have political legitimacy. So, in this book, I attempt to articulate the idea of Confucian sentimental representation. In doing so, this book provides (1) a Confucian conception of political representation and (2) the normative justification of Confucian sentimental representation in democratic society.

There are several questions and problems that I should deal with in order to clarify this book's aim, scope, and methodology. First of all, it is unclear whether sentimental representation or affective accountability is truly a distinctive feature of East Asian democracies because a political leader's morally cultivated affective response to ordinary citizens' emotional states has also been seen as an important political virtue in the Western political tradition. Indeed, in the aftermath of the Grenfell Tower fire in London, British Prime Minister Theresa May was harshly criticized for her perceived lack of empathy: she visited the site only briefly and left after talking with a few firefighters, showing, her critics argued, no sincere concern for victims and their families. US President George W. Bush's approval numbers dropped significantly after Hurricane Katrina, not only because he failed to handle the disaster itself in a timely and efficient way but also because he did not show a proper affective response to people in a desperate situation. And since his first US presidential election campaign, Donald Trump has been criticized for his biased and morally deficient words and actions; he does not, evidently, properly care about people's anger, sorrow, or resentment.

I do not ignore these political realities; thus, I do not say that a political leader's moral virtue is not considered an important political value in Western civil society. What I argue is that it seems that Western civil society does not seriously consider a political leader's affective accountability as a normative standard to judge whether he/she can have the legitimate right to rule; more importantly, my primary concern in this book is that normative representation theory in Western political philosophy has failed to properly address such political realities and provide normative criteria for them. As discussed earlier, many scholars, especially those working from the perspective of Western political philosophy and political science, have had reservations about the role of emotions and feelings in establishing normative political philosophy. In particular, as I will demonstrate in the next chapter, recent normative representation theories (particularly in deliberative democracy literature) have heavily relied on deliberative norms in regulating what they deem to be irrational, myopic, and selfish political judgment among citizens as well as their pathological consequences. As a result, normative representation theories in Western political philosophy do not tell us

why emotions matter politically, what kinds of emotions are important, how a political leader should respond to them, and whether a political leader's affective response can be a constitutive element of judging his/her political legitimacy. In this regard, my critique of Western normative representation theory is not that the limitations of normative representation theory in Western political philosophy are determined by the nature of Western civil society. Rather, it is the result of the theoretical orientation in Western political philosophy: the Kantian and Utilitarian paradigms. Thus, this book (particularly, in Chapter 2) traces how normative representation theory, which does not pay close attention to the role of emotions and feelings in the process of political representation, has developed in modern Western political philosophy, and suggests an alternative approach to political representation.

Political Representation in Confucian Political Theory

Over the past two decades, Confucian political theory has achieved remarkable progress by reconstructing the moral ideal of Confucian virtue politics to be compatible with democratic values and institutions in three ways. Sungmoon Kim reconstructs the core idea of Confucian virtue politics in ways that correspond with democratic principles and rights (Kim 2014, 2016, 2018a); Stephen Angle and Sor-hoon Tan justify the value of political participation in terms of its contribution to moral self-cultivation or ethical growth, although Tan does not endorse the principle of one person, one vote grounded in the Christian belief that all humans are created equal (Tan 2004; Tan 2016) and Angle also leaves open the question of the best possible voting scheme (Angle 2012). Dainiel Bell, Tongdong Bai, and Joseph Chan have justified the unequal distribution of political power by appeal to the meritocratic ideal of Confucian virtue politics and suggested different selection mechanisms and legislature structure (Bai 2013, 2019; Bell 2006, 2015; Chan 2014).¹¹ Accordingly, although the question of how Confucian virtue politics and democracy whose underlying ideas and values are grounded in seemingly incompatible moral foundations can be reconciled still remains debatable, Confucian political theorists have articulated the Confucian conceptions of common good, political authority, political participation, civility, citizenship, public reason, and political relationship between the ruler and the ruled. This implies that we can draw the constitutive elements of Confucian sentimental representation from their theories and I do not deny or reject their contribution to theorizing Confucian sentimental representation.

The current debate on Confucian democracy and Confucian meritocracy, however, still do not give a clear answer to the questions of what exactly political representation means and how it can be theorized in the Confucian context. This is mainly because political representation has been thought of as the product of wholly Western political ideas and experiences and usually understood as inherently connected to liberal democracy, so that Confucian political theorists who do not accept the basic ideas of liberal democracy—particularly the idea of one person, one vote—have not paid close attention to the concept of political

representation. Surprisingly, it appears that the advocates of Confucian democracy who attempt to accommodate Confucianism in a way compatible with democratic principles and rights have not been able to address the problem of political representation in a philosophically satisfying way. As a result, constitutive elements of Confucian sentimental representation—an ethical relationship as a political good, a political leader's affective accountability, and their connection to political legitimacy—are not properly discussed in their theory.

To sum up, in East Asian societies, Korea in particular where Confucianism profoundly influenced political ideas and moral values in the past and where its public culture has been influenced by Confucian values and mores, political leaders' conduct, encompassing their everyday languages, behaviors, and expressions when facing citizens' sorrow, anger, and resentment, offers a critical standard according to which to evaluate whether they have political legitimacy. Unfortunately, existing representation theories in Western political philosophy cannot adequately account for the ideal of political representation in Confucianism because they revolve around the common theme of transcending political agents' emotions and feelings (affective sentiments in particular) in political representation. Surprisingly, despite recent remarkable progress in Confucian political theory, Confucian political theorists have not paid due attention to the idea of political representation in the Confucian context. Therefore, this book attempts to theorize Confucian sentimental representation.

Which Political Representation?

Two crucial questions arise. First, the core ideas and principles of political representation developed during the English parliamentary revolution in the seventeenth century, and finally combined with the idea of self-government through the American and French revolutions in the eighteenth century. This means that political representation in the modern context cannot be perfectly independent of the idea of popular sovereignty. The question, then, is this: given that Confucian virtue politics does not endorse the idea of popular sovereignty grounded in the possessive conceptions of political right and authority, how can political representation be theorized in the Confucian context? Second, as discussed above, given that prominent Confucian political theorists have already conceptualized the constitutive elements of Confucian political representation—albeit not systematically—why should Confucian virtue politics be reconstructed from the perspective of political representation rather than Confucian democracy or Confucian meritocracy? These two questions can be properly answered when the fundamental questions of this book are clearly answered: *What is political representation?* and *Which conception of political representation can be reconstructed from a Confucian perspective?*

I would like to begin to answer these questions by clarifying the scope of this book. This book does not examine how the idea or the concept of political representation has developed in the Western political tradition, nor does it attempt to articulate the concept of political representation found in the entire Confucian history, and replace its meaning with an authentically Confucian term.

This book only focuses on (1) *the concept of political representation* and (2) *the principles of representative government* in the modern Western political context in order to find the moral and philosophical foundation of representative government on which contemporary East Asian democracies are formally predicated. Therefore, this book follows a widely accepted approach among contemporary political theorists and examines *political representation as a concept* as found in the modern Western political tradition and *political representation as the principles* of modern democratic government.¹² Since the idea of political representation was linked with the idea of self-government in the eighteenth century, political representation in Western political philosophy has rested on three basic concepts which together constitute the principles of representative government: *authorization*, by which constituents transfer the right to make judgments and exercise will regarding their own interests to a representative; *making sound judgments*, by which a representative who gains the consent of constituents discerns constituents' or the whole society's interests on behalf of them; and *accountability*, by which constituents impose sanctions on a representative or require a representative's explanation on political issues and processes.¹³ Let us examine the three basic concepts of political representation in Western political philosophy by focusing on the relation among them.

Representation as authorization The distinctive feature of political representation as authorization since Thomas Hobbes' social contract theory, which conceptualized the idea of transferring the right to make judgments and exercise will to a sovereign, is that it makes a special relationship and psychology between the representative and the represented. When selecting a representative according to our own normative standards and authorizing his/her political power, we normally think that 'I give you my right to make judgments and exercise will because you are believed to be more qualified than me. Thus, your political authority comes from my choice'. What is important is that it is not the existence of a representative body or representatives but this special relationship and psychology that differentiates representative democracy from direct democracy. Contrary to what is usually believed today, in Ancient Greece, not all offices and powers were exercised by the assembled people, and substantial powers—sometimes greater than those of the Assembly—were exercised by separate, smaller bodies (Manin 1997: 41). Although not all powers were directly exercised by the people and hence there were representatives who carried out public offices instead of the people, we do not call the Ancient Greek political system a representative government. This is mainly because public offices and powers were distributed by lot in the Ancient Greek political system and hence there was no such thing as a concept of transferring the right to make judgments and exercise will to a sovereign. When public offices and powers are distributed by lot, we might be able to say that those who hold the public offices are representing our nation or the majority as a whole. But we do not feel the same relationship and psychology between the representative and the represented mentioned above because, in the case of authorization by lot, the authority of public offices is not directly given by my individual choice; rather it is randomly distributed according to the rule determined by the collective will. Understood in this way, as Pitkin rightly points out, among 'the idea of substitution or acting instead of, the

idea of taking care of or acting in the interest of, and the idea of acting as a subordinate, on instructions, in accord with the wishes of another, none of the three, by itself, turns out to be a satisfactory equivalent of the idea of representing' (Pitkin 1967: 139). The relationship between the representative and the represented should be regulated by the idea of authorization that makes the special relationship and psychology between them. The action of the representative must be ascribed to the represented. The virtuous ruler can be called a representative not when he/she pursues the interests of the people or represents a moral symbol of nation, but when his/her action can be ascribed to his/her people.

Representation as making sound judgments Political representation as authorization posed one critical problem for modern representation theory. That political representation is regulated by authorization that makes a representative's action ascribed to his/her constituents means that a representative's normative action of making sound judgments for discerning the true interest of society also should be ascribed to his/her constituents. The question then is how two seemingly incompatible ideas in political representation—the democratic idea of deriving the justification of sound political judgment from the people's direct participation in the decision-making process and the meritocratic idea of making sound political judgments by virtuous and talented representatives—can be reconciled. With regard to this problem, while acknowledging the people as the ultimate source of political power, modern political philosophers and thinkers paid close attention to the moral source of sound political judgments on the one hand, and establishing a proper distance between representatives and constituents that best enables the action of making sound political judgments on the other hand.¹⁴ Although modern political philosophers and thinkers have proposed the principles of representative government and proper institutional mechanisms in the belief that representative government is an utterly new idea differentiated from democracy in that it prevents the people from direct political participation, and hence they have often been criticized for advocating blatant elitism, their ideas and institutional proposals have still provided a valid theoretical framework for democratic political representation. For example, contemporary deliberative democrats have attempted to shift the focal point of political representation from the dichotomous understanding of indirectness as defect of representative government and directness as merit of direct democracy to the question of normative conditions for sound political judgments by understanding indirectness and directness not in terms of the physical distance between representatives and constituents but in terms of whether the distance can engender genuine normative interactions between them. On this view, 'political representation is a comprehensive filtering, refining, and mediating process of political will formation and expression' (Urbinati 2000: 760). Thus, indirectness in political representation makes room for deliberation and encourages constituents to deliberate public issues rather than to merely vote according to their preferences by fostering 'a relationship between the assembly and the people that enables the demos to reflect upon itself and judge its laws, institutions, and leaders' (761). Understood in this way, the primary concern of political representation as making sound judgments is neither indirect governance nor

the location of sovereignty but instead (1) the moral source of sound political judgments and (2) the distance between the representative and the represented that best enables the discernment of the true interests of society. In other words, political representation can be understood in terms of the practices by which a representative makes sound judgments on behalf of those he/she represents and forms a political relationship with them.

Representation as accountability Accountability can be defined in terms of ‘enforcement’ and ‘answerability’. The former refers to ‘the right to hold other actors to a set of standards, to judge whether they have fulfilled their responsibilities in light of these standards, and to impose sanctions if they determine that these responsibilities have not been met’ (Keohane and Grant 2005: 29). The latter refers to the duty (on the part of the representative) to respond to constituents’ questions and the right (of the constituent) to ask a representative questions even if the questions are ‘nasty’ and ‘uncomfortable’ (Schedler 1999: 14). What is important is that ‘a set of standards’ to judge whether a representative has fulfilled their responsibilities, and the content, scope, and style of the questions are determined by the nature of the moral source employed by representatives when they make sound political judgments. For example, if Kantian rationality or Utilitarian rationality provides a representative with the moral source of sound political judgments, it determines ‘a set of standards’ and ‘the content, scope, and style’ of his/her accountability. As I will demonstrate in the next chapter, this fact makes it possible to define normative representation theory in Western political philosophy as what I shall call *rationalist representation*. Let us now go back to the question of how political representation can be reconstructed from a Confucian perspective. Given that Confucianism does not endorse the idea of popular sovereignty and political equality and hence the ideas of ‘authorization by the people’ and ‘accountability as enforcement’ are not found in the Confucian tradition, this book attempts to conceptualize constitutive elements of Confucian political representation in terms of ‘representation as making sound judgments’ and ‘accountability as answerability’. In doing so, I conceptualize a distinctively Confucian conception of political representation and analyze how it is differentiated from rationalist representation in Western political philosophy.¹⁵

Why Confucian Sentimental Representation rather than Confucian Democracy or Confucian Meritocracy?

Let us now turn to the second question: why should Confucian virtue politics be reconstructed from the perspective of political representation rather than Confucian democracy or Confucian meritocracy? Confucian sentimental representation as a theoretical framework has one important advantage compared with Confucian democracy. Although there has been controversy over the genuine meaning of democracy among political theorists, and democracy has often been associated with a set of values or institutions, no doubt, the heart of democracy concerns the equal distribution of political power. Accordingly, in the past two decades, the philosophical debates among Confucian political theorists have largely revolved

around the question of whether democratic principles (i.e., popular sovereignty and political equality) should be understood as indispensable elements of Confucian democracy, and if so, how they can be justified from a Confucian perspective. One problem is that, as the main concern of Confucian political theory has become the justification of political (in)equality, the question of how to realize the ethical ideal of Confucian virtue politics in modern East Asia has become blurred. For example, Bell and Bai mainly focus on the question of how to justify the unequal distribution of political power by appeal to the idea of Confucian virtue politics; despite his seminal works and their contribution to the theory of Confucian democracy, Kim is ‘more concerned with the modes of democratic citizenship than with personal moral growth on the monistic road toward sagehood’ (Kim 2018a: 48); although Tan, Angle, and Chan pay close attention to the value of moral growth in Confucianism and justify the value of political participation in terms of its contribution to moral growth (Tan and Angle) or suggest the expressive value of democracy that can enhance an ethical relationship between a political leader and ordinary citizens in a democratic society (Chan), they do not clearly show how Confucian ethical aims can be achieved in actual democratic political processes.

In this book, I provide an alternative theoretical framework for Confucian political theory by relying on the idea of political representation in two respects. First of all, political representation as a concept, which inherently concerns a certain kind of action, particularly one that requires a representative to act for the interests of society in relation to his/her constituents, provides us with a proper theoretical framework for analyzing the idea of Confucian virtue politics, at the core of which lies a virtuous ruler’s normative action for the well-being of the people. As discussed in the previous part (and notes no. 13 and 15), although representation as making sound judgments cannot perfectly avoid the problem of authorization, compared with democracy, it is relatively independent of the idea of popular sovereignty or the problem of the equal distribution of political power. Second, when political representation is understood as the principles of representative government, it also provides us with a proper theoretical framework for reconstructing the idea of Confucian virtue politics to be compatible with liberal democracy. In the Western political tradition, the meritocratic principles of political representation have well combined with the idea of popular sovereignty and political equality. This implies that Confucian meritocracy at the core of which lies rule by a virtuous and talented person also can be compatible with liberal democracy without abandoning democratic principles and rights. Taken together, political representation as a concept and political representation as the principles of representative government together provide an alternative theoretical framework for reconstructing the ideal of Confucian virtue politics to be compatible with contemporary East Asian democracy.

Outline of The Book

This book consists of five main chapters including this introductory chapter. In Chapters 2 and 3, I conceptualize political representation in Western political philosophy and Confucian political theory respectively. In Chapters 4 and 5,

I defend democratic Confucian political representation by critically engaging with the current debate between Confucian democracy and Confucian meritocracy.

In the next chapter (Chapter 2), I examine the defining features of political representation in Western political philosophy and conceptualize rationalist representation. One interesting point in the recent development of normative representation theory in Western political philosophy is that despite its attempt to understand political representation as continuing and relational processes, the core idea of political representation seems to be grounded in the modern Western rationalist tradition that regards emotions and feelings as incomplete and dangerous things that should be refined and controlled. Accordingly, in Western normative representation theory, emotions and feelings do not play a crucial role in discovering the true interests of society and fulfilling political responsibility. The question then is how the idea of modern rationalism has influenced the formation of contemporary normative representation theory and why normative representation theory is still grounded on the idea of modern rationalism. Chapter 2 gives an answer to this question by conceptualizing what I shall call rationalist representation with special attention to three key concepts in political representation: authorization, making sound judgments, and accountability. In Western political philosophy, representative government proposed by modern political thinkers and philosophers is established on two principles: the distance principle and the difference principle. The former prevents the people from directly participating in decision-making processes and the latter refers to qualitative differences between actual decision makers and the holders of final authority. While the two principles shape the form of modern representative government, the difference principle regulated by the idea of rule by reason constitutes a distinctively rationalist conception of political representation. According to the idea of rationalist representation, a representative should rely on a rational capacity—rational calculation or moral reflection—that requires him/her to transcend all contingent elements when discerning the true interests of society. Therefore, in the process of discerning the true interests of society, emotions and feelings are regarded as irrational, dangerous, and unrefined things that ought to be controlled by rational calculation or deliberation. In addition, an ethical or affective political relationship between representatives and constituents has no primary value in rationalist representation. In Chapter 2, I trace how this rationalist representation had been formed in the Western political tradition and examine how it has influenced normative representation theory in Western political philosophy.

In Chapter 3, I conceptualize Confucian sentimental representation. Given that ‘authorization by the people’ and ‘accountability as enforcement’ cannot work in the Confucian tradition, I attempt to conceptualize constitutive elements of Confucian sentimental representation with special attention to the true interests of society in Confucianism, the way of advancing these interests, and the idea of affective accountability. Political representation in the Western rationalist tradition requires a political leader to transcend emotions and feelings when discerning the true interests of society, thereby decoupling *acting for the people* from *sharing emotions and feelings*

with the people and transforming them into morally cultivated ones. On the contrary, Confucian sentimental representation requires a political leader to sincerely pay attention to people's emotions and feelings, and transform them into morally cultivated ones because not only does such affective interaction provide a political leader with the moral source of sound political judgments for benevolent government but it also constitutes an intrinsic good in the political realm by enabling a political leader and common people to share joyful harmony with the Way. Therefore, Confucian sentimental representation gives rise to an alternative conception of representation as 'acting with the people'. Although democracy is not a necessary condition for Confucian sentimental representation, Confucian sentimental representation, which affirms the intrinsic value of an affective political relationship and places it at the center of politics, provides normative standards for the current debate between Confucian democracy and Confucian meritocracy.

In Chapters 4 and 5, I defend *democratic* Confucian sentimental representation. In Chapter 4, I defend democratic Confucian sentimental representation in a negative way by critically engaging with Confucian meritocrats' main arguments and demonstrating that their arguments are not convincing. Bell and Bai have rejected electoral democracy predicated on political equality institutionalized by the 'one person, one vote' system. The problem with their justification of the unequal distribution of political power is that they do not pay close attention to the intrinsic value of the ruler's moral virtues and their contribution to the ethically good life of the political community, which is the most critical factor for judging whether a political leader has political legitimacy according to the ideal of Confucian virtue politics. Instead, they are overly preoccupied with the instrumental value of a political leader's competence, its role in bringing about good political outcomes. In doing so, they overlook that the heart of political meritocracy in Confucian virtue politics does not lie in the ruler's competence but rather in the ruler's moral virtue. On the other hand, despite his elaborate analysis of the two constitutive elements of legitimate political authority in Confucianism and justification of democratic institutions, one critical problem arises for Chan's view. By proposing a second chamber, in which non-democratically selected senior public servants monitor the elected chamber and serve as moral exemplars, the expressive value of democracy and the ideal of the meritocratic rule in his theory clash with each other. As a result, it becomes unclear how ordinary citizens and political leaders, particularly the members of the second chamber, can form and express mutual commitment in the actual political process. After all, Bell, Bai and Chan all overlook the possibility that Confucian meritocracy can be better realized in a democratic society in which virtuous political leadership is cultivated by mutual moral transformation between a political leader and ordinary citizens, mediated by democratic principles and institutions. Therefore, in Chapter 5, I demonstrate how the idea of Confucian meritocracy can be better realized in democratic society by defending Confucian sentimental representation in democratic society.

When turning our attention from criticizing Confucian non-democratic meritocracy to reconstructing Confucian meritocracy in a way compatible with democratic principles, one critical problem arises. Given that pluralism is increasingly characterizing East Asian societies, as citizens in the region cherish the value of personal autonomy and individual freedom protected by the constitution, there might be various non-Confucians who have incompatible moral, religious, and philosophical doctrines; they are likely to refuse a Confucian political leader who subscribes to the Confucian comprehensive doctrine and attempts to make laws and policies on the basis of it. This reality casts doubt on Confucian democratic meritocracy in two respects. First, a Confucian political leader's attempt to exert his/her moral power makes for an authoritarian social atmosphere and, more importantly, his/her attempt to make public laws and policies based on a comprehensive Confucian doctrine is likely to oppress non-Confucian citizens. In other words, a political leader's influence is so strong that a slippery slope toward authoritarian-style political leadership and governance cannot be stopped. Second, and conversely, one might argue that socio-economic conditions and perceptions of Confucian values as crucial for shoring up accepted Confucian conceptions of the individual, the family, and society have changed significantly in the past two decades, mainly owing to the young generation's refusal of undemocratic authority, a great emphasis on individuality, a low-growth economy, and the increase in the number of one-person households. As a result, 'Confucian mores and values' are already considerably depleted and a Confucian political leader's influence would be so weak that he/she would not be chosen by democratic citizens in East Asian societies.

In Chapter 5, I deal with the problem of pluralism in Confucian political theory mentioned above and defend democratic Confucian sentimental representation in a positive way by critically engaging with the current debate on Kim's theory of Confucian public reason. To this end, I first demonstrate that despite Chan's and the liberal-minded theorists' insightful and theoretically convincing critiques of Kim's public reason Confucianism, they are missing Kim's original intention and theoretical ambition in *Public Reason Confucianism*. Rather, my reservations about Kim's public reason Confucianism are that although I agree with the core ideas of public reason Confucianism, Kim's public reason Confucianism loses a political, dynamic, and affective character penetrating his entire work by unwittingly separating the proper location of Confucian public reasons into Confucian citizens, who are mainly motivated to take part in public deliberation by critical affection, and the constitutional court, which is capable of highly abstract and philosophically elaborate reasoning. Therefore, I suggest Confucian sentimental representation, which places political leaders who can soothe ordinary citizens' critical affection and transform it into morally cultivated one by providing them with more organized but still affectionate Confucian justifications of controversial issues at the center of political participation, in order to complement Kim's public reason Confucianism. My suggestion contributes to achieving the ideal of Confucian virtue politics, as well as the idea of public reason Confucianism in democratic society.

Notes

- 1 A majority of citizens in East Asian societies, including China and Singapore where political equality is not guaranteed, think of democracy as the best form of government (Pan and Wu 2016). However, among the four defining features of democracy—freedom and liberty, social equality, good governance, and norms and procedures—East Asians recognize good governance and social equality rather than norms and procedures and freedom and liberty as the defining features of democracy (Chu, Huang and Lu 2013; Pan and Wu 2016).
- 2 According to Doh Chull Shin's empirical study based on the Asian Barometer Survey, people in the six countries—China (70 percent), Singapore (57 percent), and Vietnam (74 percent) Japan (24 percent), Taiwan (26 percent), and Korea (36 percent)—positively responded to the statement as follows: 'government leaders are like the head of a family: we should all follow their decisions' (Shin 2012).
- 3 For an account of the collective identity of Korean citizens based on critical affection, see Kim (2014, Ch. 8); on the Confucian conception of the public and the private and its influence on the general ideological position of the members of Korean civil society, see Hahm (2004); on the historical origin of Korean civil society which can be found in Confucian scholar-officials who enjoyed a degree of autonomy and had great moral authority in remonstrating with the king in the Chosŏn dynasty, see Cho (1997); for the (negative) influence of the Confucian political culture in the consolidating period of Korean democracy, see Heo and Hahm (2014); and particularly, for the profound Confucian influence on political actors' moral self-consciousness in democratic movements in the 1980s, see Lee (2007).
- 4 2016Hun-Na. <https://english.ccourt.go.kr/site/eng/decisions/casesearch/caseSearchPop.do>. Accessed January 15, 2021.
- 5 For a more extensive analysis on the test of gravity and how the KCC's decision can be analyzed from a Confucian perspective, see Kim (2019).
- 6 It was first reported by several news media, including TV Chosun Broadcasting Company (August 2, 2016), *Hankyoreh Daily News* (September 20, 2016), and *Kyunghyang Daily News* (October 18, 2016) that Choi Soon-sil, who had been a long friend of President Park since the 1970s when Choi's father, Chi Tae-min, advised Park, had access to confidential information (i.e. information only the president should have had) and used unauthorized power via President Park's senior staff members to extort ₩77.4 billion (\$60 million) from Korean chaebols for two nonprofit foundations that she set up. On October 24, 2016, as JTBC Newsroom disclosed that Choi had received 44 presidential speeches before the President publicly announced, this scandal was publicized.
- 7 The four main issues reviewed by the KCC in judging whether President Park should be impeached are as follows: 1) whether a private individual (Choi Sun-sil) was permitted to intervene in state affairs and whether the authority of the president was abused for Choi Sun-sil's intervention in state affairs; 2) whether the power to appoint and dismiss public officials had been abused; 3) whether the freedom of the press had been infringed upon; and 4) whether the duty to protect the right to life had been violated. The KCC ruled that there was insufficient evidence to answer the second and third in the affirmative, and that 'whether the respondent faithfully executed her duties on the day of the Sewol ferry tragedy cannot in and of itself constitute a ground for impeachment, and therefore is not a subject matter for impeachment adjudication'. As for the first issue, the KCC ruled that President Park violated 1) the obligation to serve the public interest (violation of Article 7 Section 1, etc. of the Constitution), 2) the freedom and property rights of enterprises (violation of Article 15 and Article 23 Section 1, etc. of the Constitution), and 3) the duty of confidentiality. On the basis of this judgment, the KCC ruled that President Park was impeached. 2016Hun-Na1 (March 10, 2017). <https://english.ccourt.go.kr/site/eng/decisions/casesearch/caseSearchPop.do>. Accessed 15 January 2021.

- 8 The *Sewol* ferry incident refers to a national disaster that happened on April 15, 2014. According to the official record of the KCC, 'The passenger ship *Sewol* ferry departed for Jeju Island from the Incheon Port Coast Passenger Terminal on April 15, 2014, with a total of 476 people on board including 443 passengers, of which 325 were Danwon High School students on a school trip, and 33 crew members. While on sail around 08:48 on April 16, 2014, the hull began listing to the left at 1.8 nautical miles north of Byeongpung Island, part of the township of Jodo in Jindo County, South Jeolla Province and finally sank into the Southern sea of Korea. In this incident, only 172 people were rescued and 304 passengers and crew were unable to escape from the ship and ended up dead or missing' (2016Hun-Na1).
- 9 2016Hun-Na1. <https://english.court.go.kr/site/eng/decisions/casesearch/caseSearchPop.do>. Accessed January 15, 2021.
- 10 Kim also clearly shows this point. According to him, the reason why President Park lost the trust of the Korean people is that she did not possess 'the right moral character expected of the nation's highest political leader'. In particular, 'when it was repeatedly proven that she not only lacked core virtues for good leadership such as benevolence, sincerity, trustworthiness, responsibility, and compassion, but rather had gone actively against the ideal of good government by being callous to the suffering of the people and entrusting the government to a friend who was totally unqualified and had no interest in the public good, many ordinary Koreans finally came to the conclusion that she was unsuited for this post and should be removed immediately' (Kim 2018b, 330). However, contrary to Kim who does not pay close attention to the importance of an ethical relationship between political leaders and ordinary citizens in a democratic system, in this book, I conceptualize Confucian sentimental representation that places an ethical relationship between political leaders and ordinary citizens at the center of Confucian democracy. For my critique of Kim's Confucian democracy and public reason Confucianism, and suggestion, see Chapter 5 in this book.
- 11 While strong meritocrats (Bell and Bai) do not advocate the value of electoral democracy, Chan clearly acknowledges the values of electoral democracy in terms of its expressive value and its contribution to the protection of basic interests. And, although Chan leaves open the question of whether his second chamber has overriding power over a democratically elected chamber, his conception of democracy and institutional proposal are more moderate than those of the two meritocrats. For more detailed comparison between their meritocracy, see Chapter 4.
- 12 Although many political philosophers have sought to conceptualize political representation since Hanna Pitkin's seminal work *The Concept of Representation*, their consensus is that the concept of representation is a surely contested one in that 'any conception of representation, of whatever type, is bound to contain within it tensions that allow it to be deployed in different ways' (Runciman and Vieira 2008: xi). The difficulty of conceptualizing political representation mainly comes from the fact that it is a ubiquitous concept or idea that can be applied to non-political activities and relationships. This fact becomes clear when we examine key concepts and their core ideas in political philosophy: democracy is characterized by political equality and collective self-determination; liberalism's core idea rests on basic freedoms and the protection of them against government; and republicanism is defined in terms of non-domination or the pursuit of common good. Each has its own origin and institutional arrangements. Quite the contrary, representation denotes a certain kind of action or state resulting from the way that the representative and the represented relate to each other. So, representation 'encompasses an extraordinary range of meanings and applications, stretching from mental images to economic transactions, and from legal process to theatrical performance' (Runciman and Vieira 2008: xi). For the development of the idea of representation in the Western religious and political tradition since the Roman period, see Runciman and Vieira (2008). On the emergence and development of the concept of representation in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, see

Knights (2005). Recently, many political theorists have paid close attention to newly emerging types of representation which do not fall into political representation within nation-state or electoral democracy. For example, representatives often represent the interests of constituents who live out of their electoral district (Mansbridge 2003); in the post nation-state era, non-government organizations such as the WTO, the UN, and Greenpeace represent people's interests without democratic authorization and accountability (Rehfeld 2006); and even world-famous celebrities can represent citizens' voices, emotions, and discourses (Dryzek and Niemeyer 2008).

- 13 Although many political philosophers have provided different conceptions of political representation, which do not perfectly overlap one another, their conceptions of political representation can be characterized by Pitkin's four conceptions of representation: formalistic, substantive, descriptive, and symbolic representation. For example, Quentin Skinner suggests three metaphors of political representation indicating the origin of the term 'representation': pictorial, juridical, and theatrical representation, each of which corresponds with Pitkin's descriptive representation, mandated and independent ways of acting for in substantive representation (Skinner 2005). Philip Pettit also classifies political representation into three conceptions: indicative representation, interpretative representation, and directed representation. While indicative representation corresponds with descriptive representation, the latter two conceptions of representation correspond with substantive representation (independent and mandated ways of acting for) (Pettit 2009). However, while criticizing Pitkin's conceptions of representation established on a representative's interest-seeking action for blurring the meaning of representation, Rehfeld suggests three conceptions of political representation which do not rely on interest-seeking action. According to him, representation refers to 'the exercise or the possession of the specific social power when audiences recognize them as stand-ins for others in order to do some other action (like vote, deliberate, or negotiate)' (Rehfeld 2018: 217). In addition, he suggests conveyance representation, which refers to the successful conveyance through language or other means of one thing for another. This conception of representation does not require authorization. While the former two conceptions of representation (active representation and passive representation) do not correspond with Pitkin's categories, the latter corresponds with descriptive and symbolic representation (Rehfeld 2018). In addition, all of them explicitly or implicitly ground their conceptions of political representation on modern conceptions of authorization and accountability. In Skinner's conceptions of political representation embodied during the English parliamentary revolution, representatives are authorized by the people. Although his conceptions of political representation are not tightly limited to electoral representation, Pettit also says that indicative and responsive representation have to be authorized by the representees. Rehfeld's conceptions of political representation are also based on the modern conception of authorization in that he assumes authorizers who 'have the ability to grant the social permissions necessary for' representatives' authority (Rehfeld 2018: 233).
- 14 In this book, I focus mainly on the principles of representative government proposed by the federalists, the anti-federalists, and the utilitarians.
- 15 Although the etymological origin of representation and its implication for political representation are beyond the scope of this book, we need to examine them in order to set the limit of what can be called political representation. According to Pitkin, representation means, as its etymological origin indicates, 'a making present again'. What is important is that 'except in its earliest use, however, this has always meant more than a literal bringing into presence, as one might bring a book into the room. Rather, representation, taken generally, means the making present in some sense of something which is nevertheless not present literally or in fact' (Pitkin 1967: 8–9). What is noteworthy in her conceptualization of representation in terms of its etymological origin is that in order for a certain kind of action or state to be regarded as representation, the presence of the object of representation, which is given by a representative, must not be perfectly the same as the actual presence of it. In other words, the presence of the

object of representation should be artificial or constructed by the action of representation, otherwise representation is mere presentation rather than representation. This fact gives rise to the question of how representatives can form, shape, and organize the true presence of the object of representation on the one hand, and the question of how constituents can check and monitor whether the presence represented by representatives is true or not on the other hand. In Pitkin's theory of representation, while representation as acting for others gives an answer to the first question, representation as authorization and accountability gives an answer to the latter question. And, as discussed earlier, in the Western political tradition, political representation is predicated on two conditions: first, a political agent is believed to have capacity to judge whether the presence of the object of representation is true or not. Second, a political agent has the legitimate right to make decisions according to his/her own judgment. Therefore, the relationship between the representative and the represented should be established in a way that the presence is well tracked, monitored, and even rejected by the represented. Otherwise, a representative's action is not representation, but paternalism. This is the reason why Pitkin does not regard the relationship between parents and children as representation. On the other hand, there is a case that the represented is incapable of forming or judging his/her own interests but can be represented. If parents defend their children's interest in a context where that interest needs to be made present before an audience (in this case, teachers and other parents) so that the audience can check and monitor the children's interest, the parents' action of pursuing their children's interest can be called representation, although the children's ability to object to their parents' decision is still limited (Runciman and Vieira 2008: 73). The question then is when a benevolent ruler in the traditional Confucian society where equal political right is not endorsed acts for or speaks for the interests of his/her people, can we say that he/she is making the people's interests present? On the one hand, given that in the traditional Confucian society, the ruler's decision was not made by his/her own arbitrary judgment but checked and monitored by virtuous ministers who suggested competing interpretations of what is truly good for society, the ruler's action can be called representation. On the other hand, even so, the ruler's benevolent action cannot be called representation because if the ruler can claim to be able to act for the interests of people without the institutional protection of ordinary citizens' political right to object to the ruler's decision, his/her action is not representation but simple paternalism.

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