무역 관계의 무기화와 대중 여론
(Weaponized Trade and Public Opinion)

양준석
정치외교학과
Motivation

Global economies have become rapidly interconnected and are now experiencing the deepest level of interdependence in human history.

Source: World Development Indicator (World Bank)
Motivation

HOWEVER, countries have recently increasingly engaged in trade disputes (a total of 615 dispute cases in the WTO)
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In particular, "Weaponization of Trade": trade as a foreign policy tool to achieve political and/or economic goals.
Motivation

2019: Japan’s Import Restriction on Korea and "No Japan" boycott

Japan’s Export restrictions on key high-tech materials to South Korea

In response, "No Japan" boycott
Motivation

2016: THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense) standoff

China imposed economic coercion due to THAAD deployment in South Korea

Rise in unfavorable views of China and public support for economic retaliation
Motivation

US-China Trade War

Sources: Wall Street Journal (Left) and New York Times (Right)
Existing studies suggest that economic interdependence encourages citizens to prioritize material interests and incentivizes them to seek cooperation over conflicts (e.g., Russet and Oneil 2001; Gartzke 2007)

High economic interdependence among countries

Economically hostile actions = self-destructive

But, in fact, more conflicts
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Puzzle: Why do state leaders adopt aggressive trade policies that result in trade conflicts, despite the significant economic costs of such actions?
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Economically hostile actions $=\text{self-destructive}$.

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**Puzzle**: Why do state leaders adopt aggressive trade policies that result in trade conflicts, despite the significant economic costs of such actions?

Public opinion can play a crucial role in understanding this contradiction.
Public attitudes toward hostile trade policies

Study 1: Rewarding Belligerence: Public Opinion and Audience Costs in Trade Conflicts

• Investigate how individuals perceive engagement in, and escalation of, economically costly trade conflicts, as well as how these perceptions influence their evaluation of leaders during such conflicts

• Survey experiment in the U.S.

Study 2: Target, Information, and Trade Preferences: Evidence from Survey Experiment in East Asia

• Examines whether and how public support for protectionism vary when the target country is identified and is mitigated by cost information

• Survey experiment in East Asia (South Korea, Japan, and China)
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Foreshadow

To foreshadow, overall,

**Study 1: Rewarding Belligerence: Public Opinion and Audience Costs in Trade Conflicts**

- Public reward leaders for issuing threats of trade conflict.
- Public condemn leaders when leaders back down during trade conflicts.

**Study 2: Target, Information, and Trade Preferences: Evidence from Survey Experiment in East Asia**

- Public support for protectionism increases when the target country is identified (while varying across the countries)
- Cost information mitigate public support for ‘targeted protectionism’ (while varying across the countries)
Study 1:
Rewarding Belligerence: Public Opinion and Audience Costs in Trade Conflicts
(with Ashton Cho)
Q: Why do countries engage in trade conflicts, despite the anticipated economic losses? And, why do countries, once engaged, rarely back down or compromise, leading to prolonged disputes like the US-China trade war?

We address these questions and argue that public opinion plays a crucial role in explaining these puzzling behaviors.

Specifically, we leverage one of the most prominent theoretical tools to understand crisis bargaining in international relations.

**Audience Costs (Fearon 1994):** “the domestic price that a leader would pay for making foreign threats and then backing down” (Tomz, 2007)
Audience Costs = Inconsistency Costs + Belligerence Costs
(Kertzer and Brutger 2016)
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(1) Inconsistency Costs:

- function of individuals evaluating leadership competence, trustworthiness, reputation as well as alignment with norms of keeping promises (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith, 2012; Levy et al., 2015).
- largely independent of issue-area.
Application of Audience Costs to Trade Conflicts

Audience Costs = Inconsistency Costs + Belligerence Costs
(Kertzer and Brutger 2016)

(2) Belligerence Costs:

- Perceive costs from trade conflicts:
  - Relatively small compared to those from military conflicts: not immediately violent and expected cause deaths.
  - Difficult to attribute economic losses to trade wars.
- Signal of resolve to rectify previous trade commitments, reject inaction, and stand up to the challenge of an unfair trading partner.
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→ **Belligerence benefits? instead of costs?**

In sum, **Trade Conflicts:**
Inconsistency Costs(-) + **Belligerence Costs**(-) = Audience Costs(-)
Inconsistency Costs(-) + **Belligerence Benefits**(+) = Audience Costs(?)
Hence, we examine whether and how audience costs operate differently between different trade conflicts. (Trade war Vs. Institutional trade dispute).

Specifically, we test the following hypotheses:

1. Trade wars (unilateral acts) are more aggressive and disruptive than institutional trade dispute (multilateral means).
   → **Belligerence benefits are greater for threats of trade war?**

2. Belligerence costs operate similar to traditional audience cost theory
   → **Belligerence costs are greater for threats of trade war?**

3. Audience may care more about the principle policy object than the policy means (Jentleson and Britton, 1998).
   → **Whether belligerence costs or belligerence benefit, audience costs are not different between trade war and institutional trade disputes**
Method

• Online survey experiment in March 2019

• National American sample of 1,605 registered voters (through Dynata).

• Structure of the survey experiment
  • Hypothetical scenario: Trade Deficits due to Country B’s unfair trading practices
  • Randomly assigned to one of three broad conditions (e.g., Kertzer and Brutger (2016))
    1. Stay Out
    2. Engagement
    3. Back Down

• DV: Approval for the President’s action on a 5 point scale (alternatively, voting intention)
• Following Kertzer and Brutger (2016), we estimate:

  • **Inconsistency costs:** the effect of inconsistency
    = Back Down - Engagement

  • **Belligerence costs/benefits:** the effect of threatening
    = Engagement - Stay Out

  • **Audience costs:** sum of these two components
    = Back Down - Stay Out
Main Estimands

- Inconsistency costs
  \[= \mu_e - \mu_{\neg e}\]

- Belligerence costs (or benefits)
  \[= \mu_e - \pi\]

- Audience costs
  \[= \mu_{\neg e} - \pi\]
Figure 1: Trade Conflict Bargaining Model Accounting for Two Different Threats (Tariff and WTO)
### Introduction

The following questions are about U.S. relations with other countries around the world. You will read about a situation our country has faced many times in the past and will probably face again. Different leaders have handled the situation in different ways. We will describe one approach U.S. leaders have taken, and ask whether you approve or disapprove.
Recently, the government found that Country B has been engaging in unfair trading practices, causing unemployment and a large trade deficit with the U.S.

Stay Out Condition

The President announced that “the United States would stay out of any type of trade conflict or confrontation with Country B,” whereupon Country B continued to engage in unfair trading practices.
Engage Condition

The President announced, “Country B continues to engage in unfair trade practices, [the U.S. would immediately respond by imposing tariffs on imports from Country B.” Country B continued to engage in unfair trading practices, and the President ordered the imposition of tariffs against Country B. / the U.S. will immediately pursue dispute settlement in the World Trade Organization (WTO) to address B’s unfair trading practices.” Country B continued to engage in unfair trading practices, and the President ordered the formal initiation of the WTO dispute settlement with Country B.]
<table>
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<th>Not Engage Condition</th>
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<td>The President announced, “Country B continues to engage in unfair trade practices, \textit{the U.S. would immediately respond by imposing tariffs on imports from Country B.}” Country B continued to engage in unfair trading practices. \textit{In the end, the president did not raise tariffs to address Country B’s unfair trading practices.} \textit{/ the U.S. will immediately pursue dispute settlement in the World Trade Organization (WTO) to address B’s unfair trading practices.”} Country B continued to engage in unfair trading practices. \textit{In the end, the president did not pursue the WTO dispute settlement to address Country B’s unfair trading practices.}</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Figure 2: Coefficient Plots for Belligerence Benefits, Inconsistency Costs, and Audience Costs (with 95% bootstrapped confidence intervals surrounding each point estimate)
Five suggested mechanisms:

1. Expected economic effects
2. Evaluation of the President’s competency
3. Concerns about the reputation of the U.S.
4. Concerns about the credibility of future threats and promises
5. Normative concerns

We estimate average causal mediation models (ACMEs) (Imai et al. 2011) in which we explore the extent to which the treatment effects are mediated by the different causal pathways outlined above.
Figure 3: Belligerence Benefits

Figure 4: Inconsistency Costs

Figure 5: Coefficient Plots for Average Causal Mediation Effects (with 95% confidence intervals surrounding each point estimate).
We further investigate participants’ open ended responses in which they were asked to explain why they approve or disapprove of the way the President handled the situation.

We utilized structural topic models (Roberts et al., 2014) and examine the salient themes for each experimental condition.

A few notable findings:

- Majority of the respondents in 'engage' condition point specifically to the policy of engagement addressing the unfairness of trade.
- Most respondents specifically pointed to inconsistency when received 'back down' condition by mentioning concerns about reputation, economic reasons, etc.
Trump Effects or Partisan Effects?

Heterogeneous Effects by Trump Supporter

Heterogeneous Effects by Party Identification
Heterogeneous Effects By Nationalism?

![Graph showing heterogeneous effects by nationalism. The graph compares differences in approval between strongly disagree, somewhat disagree, neither agree nor disagree, somewhat agree, and strongly agree categories for Inconsistency Cost, Belligerence Benefit, and Audience Cost. The x-axis represents the difference in approval with values ranging from -1.0 to 1.0. The y-axis shows the categories of approval levels.]
Heterogeneous Effects By Economic Self-Interests?
Quick Summary and Implication

- Evidence of Inconsistency costs and belligerence benefits in trade conflicts
  → Only equilibrium strategy is issuing a threat and never back down.
- No difference between Tariff and WTO
- Evidence of heterogeneous effects by nationalistic sentiments
- No evidence of heterogeneous effects by trump supporter / partisanship / economic self-interests
Study 2: Target, Information, and Trade Preferences: Evidence from Survey Experiment in East Asia

(with Sung Eun Kim, Jong Hee Park, and Inbok Rhee)
Motivation

We investigate public support for 'targeted protectionism' in East Asia.
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We investigate public support for ’targeted protectionism’ in East Asia.

Focus = East Asia

- East Asia is one of the most integrated regions in the world, with a significant share of intra-regional trade and a high dependence on intermediate trade
- But, the rise of "Targeted Protectionism" (ex) China and Japan over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands
- Citizens not only show strong support for trade restrictions but also engage in economically costly political actions, such as large-scale consumer boycotts against target countries despite their own country’s economic interdependence with the target.
- Allows us to examine whether and how different economic and geopolitical position affect public attitudes.
Specifically, we examine

1. whether individual support for a protectionist policy may change depending on who the target country is
   → “target effects"
2. whether individuals change their attitudes toward a protectionist policy after receiving information
   → “information effects"
1. Target effects

- Opinions about foreign countries affect the public’s foreign policy preferences (e.g., Kertzer and Zeitzoff 2017; Kertzer 2021).

- Political relationships with trade partners and sympathy/antipathy affects trade preferences (e.g., DiGiuseppe and Kleinberg 2019; Carnegie and Gaikwad 2022; Spilker et al 2018).
1. Target effects

- Opinions about foreign countries affect the public’s foreign policy preferences (e.g., Kertzer and Zeitzoff 2017; Kertzer 2021).
- Political relationships with trade partners and sympathy/antipathy affects trade preferences (e.g., DiGiuseppe and Kleinberg 2019; Carnegie and Gaikwad 2022; Spilker et al 2018).
- Citizens’ attitudes towards targeted protectionism can change when they learn which countries are targeted.
2. Information effects

- Low levels of knowledge about trade policy and its consequences on material welfare (e.g., Rankin 2001; Rho and Tomz 2017).
- The role of information in bridging personal interests and policy preferences (Schaffer and Spilker 2019; Naoi 2020).
2. Information effects

- Low levels of knowledge about trade policy and its consequences on material welfare (e.g., Rankin 2001; Rho and Tomz 2017).
- The role of information in bridging personal interests and policy preferences (Schaffer and Spilker 2019; Naoi 2020).
- Not only self-interests but also sociotropic consideration needs information about how the policy affect their nation or society.
- Information about expected costs can serve as effective cues that can activate rational reasoning:
  1. Easy to understand (accessible)
  2. Practical consequences (real-world advantages/disadvantages)
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- Three types of information about costs generated by targeted protectionism:
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  2. Practical consequences (real-world advantages/disadvantages)
- Three types of information about costs generated by targeted protectionism:
  1. Retaliation
2. Information effects

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  (2) Economic interdependence
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  2. Practical consequences (real-world advantages/disadvantages)
- Three types of information about costs generated by targeted protectionism:
  1. **Retaliation**
  2. **Economic interdependence**
  3. **Reputation**
Research Design

- Survey experiment in China, Japan, and South Korea.
- 2,259 respondents in China, 2,392 respondents in Japan, and 2,101 respondents in South Korea in November 2020.
- Hypothetical scenario in which their country is considering import restriction measures in order to protect their domestic industry in the face of the economic downturn due to COVID-19.
Research Design

- Four-by-three factorial design:
  - Four conditions about information on the costs of protectionism:
    - no information (control)
    - retaliation
    - interdependence
    - reputation
  - Three conditions about the target:
    - an unnamed foreign country (a foreign country)
    - each of the two specific neighboring countries
- DV = Support for the import restriction measures.
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Control Group</th>
<th>Korea is considering ways to reduce imports from [a foreign country/China/Japan] in order to protect the domestic industry in the face of the economic downturn due to COVID-19.</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Retaliation Treatment Group</td>
<td>Control Group + However, taking such measure is likely to hurt the Korean exports, as [the foreign country/China/Japan] may take a retaliatory action.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interdependence Treatment Group</td>
<td>Control Group + However, taking such measure is likely to hurt the exports of both Korea and [the foreign country/China/Japan], as the two countries’ economies are closely connected.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reputation Treatment Group</td>
<td>Control Group + However, taking such measure is likely to hurt Korea’s international reputation, as it can lead to a defeat in the WTO panel.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Findings: South Korea

Specific Target Effects

Support for Protectionism (%)

- Foreign: 43.3
- China: 53.6
- Japan: 54.6

Statistical Significance:
- 11.2% (p=0.000)
- 10.3% (p=0.000)
Findings: South Korea

Specific Target Effects

- Support for Protectionism (%)
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  - China: 53.6
  - Japan: 54.6

Specific Information Effects

- Support for Protectionism (%)
  - No Information: 58.7
  - Retaliation: 45.2
  - Interdependence: 50.2
  - Reputation: 47.7

Significance levels:
- 11.2% (p=0.000)
- 10.3% (p=0.000)
- -11.0% (p=0.001)
- -8.5% (p=0.005)
- -13.5% (p=0.000)
Quick Summary and Implication

- Public support for protectionism goes up when its target is a neighbor country in East Asia.
- Still, good news: cost information (material + reputation costs) reduces public support for targeted protectionism.
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- Still, good news: cost information (material + reputation costs) reduces public support for targeted protectionism.

**Implication**: Cost information $\rightarrow$ less support for weaponized trade even in a country with historical grievances, rivalry, and hostility
Additional Results

- Target-specific information effects
- Decomposition of causal effects
- Target effects by country
- Information effects given an unnamed target
- Individual characteristics and support for protectionism, by survey countries
- Support for protectionism, by nationalistic sentiments
Conclusion

- Public support for hostile trade policy (targeted protectionism)
- Political motivation to use it
- Public opinion also explains why countries cannot easily escape from the conflicts once initiated
- Good news is that cost information mitigate public support for 'targeted protectionism' (while varying across the countries)
Thank You

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Appendix
Additional Results

Study 1

- Main Findings
- Target Effect
- Information Effect
- China-Specific Effects
- Japan-Specific Effects
- Target-specific
- Sample
- Decomposition
- By Country
- Info. Effects for Foreign

- Individual
- Nationalism
- CBPS
- Target-specific
- Generic Country

Back to section start
Findings: Target Effects

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Support for Protectionism (%)</th>
<th>p-Value</th>
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<td>China</td>
<td>Foreign: 78.3</td>
<td>Target Specified: 78.0</td>
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<td>South Korea</td>
<td>Foreign: 43.3</td>
<td>Target Specified: 54.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>Foreign: 33.1</td>
<td>Target Specified: 47.9</td>
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</table>
Findings: Information Effects

China

-6.4% \( p (0.002) \)

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<td>Information</td>
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South Korea

-10.9% \( p (0.000) \)

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Japan

-12.7% \( p (0.000) \)

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<td>No Information</td>
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<tr>
<td>Information</td>
<td>39.6</td>
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Findings: Target-specific Information Effects

- **Retaliation**
  - Korea to China: \(-68\%\)
  - China to Japan: \(-47\%\)
  - Japan to Korea: \(-68\%\)

- **Interdependence**
  - Korea to Japan: \(-63\%\)
  - Japan to Korea: \(-43\%\)
  - Korea to Japan: \(-57\%\)

- **Reputation**
  - Korea to Japan: \(-50\%\)
  - Japan to Korea: \(-43\%\)
  - Korea to Japan: \(-57\%\)
## Summary statistics

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<th>Statistic</th>
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</table>
Findings: China

Specific Target Effects

Specific Information Effects

-8.8% (p=0.000) - 6.5% (p=0.006) - 3.9% (p=0.098)
Findings: Japan

Specific Target Effects

Support for Protectionism (%)

- **13.5%p (p=0.000)**
- **16.0%p (p=0.000)**

Specific Information Effects

Support for Protectionism (%)

- **-15.6%p (p=0.000)**
- **-10.6%p (p=0.000)**
- **-11.5%p (p=0.000)**

- Foreign: 33.1%
- China: 49.1%
- South Korea: 46.6%

- No Information: 52.3%
- Retaliation: 40.8%
- Interdependence: 41.7%
- Reputation: 36.8%
Study 1 - Sample

Balance Test Results of China Subgroups
Balance Test Results of Japan Subgroups
Study 1 - Sample

Balance Test Results of South Korea Subgroups
(1) **Retaliation**: A targeted country may take various retaliatory actions (i.e., antidumping and countervailing duties, export regulations, counter-tariffs) against the initiator’s protectionist policy.

(2) **Economic interdependence**: The use of economic interdependence hurt the economy of the initiating country, benefit a third country, and disrupt world trade. Citizens can anticipate the economic costs from economic interdependence without further information about target’s responses.

(3) **Reputation**: If the targeted country files a complaint with the WTO. Reputation costs of non-compliance with international norm will follow (Bechtel and Sattler, 2015; Kono 2007; Simmons 2010; Tomz 2008). Citizens tend to disapprove of the trade practices that can be subject to adjudication at the WTO due to reputational concerns (Pelc 2013; Chaudoin 2014).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Target</th>
<th>Control (1)</th>
<th>Treatment (2)</th>
<th>Treatment (3)</th>
<th>Treatment (4)</th>
<th>Information Effects</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No information</td>
<td>Retaliation</td>
<td>Interdependence</td>
<td>Reputation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign</td>
<td>0.587 (0.021)</td>
<td>0.519 (0.022)</td>
<td>0.490 (0.021)</td>
<td>0.450 (0.020)</td>
<td>-0.100 (0.025)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>0.613 (0.026)</td>
<td>0.448 (0.027)</td>
<td>0.554 (0.025)</td>
<td>0.433 (0.025)</td>
<td>-0.135 (0.030)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>0.708 (0.024)</td>
<td>0.648 (0.026)</td>
<td>0.638 (0.024)</td>
<td>0.683 (0.025)</td>
<td>-0.052 (0.029)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>0.699 (0.024)</td>
<td>0.614 (0.025)</td>
<td>0.612 (0.026)</td>
<td>0.579 (0.025)</td>
<td>-0.097 (0.029)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target effects</td>
<td>0.086 (0.026)</td>
<td>0.051 (0.027)</td>
<td>0.111 (0.026)</td>
<td>0.115 (0.025)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note*: Each cell presents the mean support for a protectionist policy in each experimental group. Information Effects and Target Effects are defined in Equation (1) and Equation (2), respectively.
# Study 1 - Target Effects by Country

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Control (1)</th>
<th>Treatment (2)</th>
<th>Treatment (3)</th>
<th>Treatment (4)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>China</strong></td>
<td>-0.051</td>
<td>-0.091</td>
<td>0.068</td>
<td>0.041</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.033)</td>
<td>(0.035)</td>
<td>(0.038)</td>
<td>(0.039)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Japan</strong></td>
<td>0.184</td>
<td>0.170</td>
<td>0.131</td>
<td>0.101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.043)</td>
<td>(0.043)</td>
<td>(0.042)</td>
<td>(0.038)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>South Korea</strong></td>
<td>0.090</td>
<td>0.033</td>
<td>0.121</td>
<td>0.192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.046)</td>
<td>(0.047)</td>
<td>(0.045)</td>
<td>(0.045)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note:* Each cell presents the estimated treatment effects and standard errors in parentheses. Column (1) presents the target effects for the control group, while columns (2), (3), and (4) report the target effects of retaliation, interdependence, and reputation cost information, respectively. Target effects are estimated from different combinations of target countries among China, Japan, and South Korea. Thus, effects must be compared across countries with caution.
Note: Reported numbers are quasibinomial logistic estimates. An arrow indicates that respondents in the sender country are willing to withdraw protectionist support if they were informed protection brings either retaliation, interdependence, or reputation cost with regard to the unknown target country.
Study 1 - Individual Characteristics and Support

Average Marginal Effects on Support for Protectionism

Note: Solid dots are coefficients of logistic regression models and horizontal bars are 95% confidence interval based on heteroskedasticity-consistent standard error. Reference Category for Industry and Employment are "Unemployed".
Note: The estimation method is the quasi-binomial logistic regression model weighted by the CBPS method.
ATT Estimates of Information Effects on Public Support for Targeted Protectionism in South Korea: The estimation method is the quasibinomial logistic regression model weighted by CBPS.
## Study 1 - Target-Specific Information Effects

### Effects of Cost Information on Public Support for Targeted Protectionism given a Target Identity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Treatment</th>
<th>Initiator</th>
<th>Target (Significance)</th>
<th>Target (Estimate)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>China</td>
<td>Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retaliation</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inter-</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reputatio</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Study 1 - Generic Country Names as a Control Condition

- To check whether respondents consider a specific country when they read a hypothetical scenario about restricting imports from a generic country A and whether the timing of the survey may have confronted unique conditions during the period of our survey (November 2020), we conducted a follow-up survey in China, Japan, and South Korea in April 2022. A total of 3,147 respondents (1295 Chinese, 1013 Japanese, and 893 South Korean adults).

- The same structure, vignettes, and questionnaires as our original survey, but we use a set of random country names, instead of China, Japan, and South Korea, for target country information.

- Specifically, the half of respondents were randomly exposed to the information on the target among a hypothetical foreign country (Country A), but the rest were randomly assigned to the scenarios where the target country is specified as one of the 8 countries that are commonly listed as one of top 15 trading partners with China, Japan, and South Korea—namely, the U.S., Vietnam, Australia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Saudi Arabia, and Thailand.
### Table 1: Decomposition of Causal Effects

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Target</th>
<th>Control (1)</th>
<th>Treatment (2)</th>
<th>Treatment (3)</th>
<th>Treatment (4)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No information</td>
<td>Interdependence</td>
<td>Reputation</td>
<td>Retaliation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Original experiment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign</td>
<td>0.587</td>
<td>0.519</td>
<td>0.490</td>
<td>0.450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.021)</td>
<td>(0.022)</td>
<td>(0.021)</td>
<td>(0.020)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>0.613</td>
<td>0.448</td>
<td>0.554</td>
<td>0.433</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.026)</td>
<td>(0.027)</td>
<td>(0.025)</td>
<td>(0.025)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>0.708</td>
<td>0.648</td>
<td>0.638</td>
<td>0.683</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.024)</td>
<td>(0.026)</td>
<td>(0.024)</td>
<td>(0.025)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>0.699</td>
<td>0.614</td>
<td>0.612</td>
<td>0.579</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.024)</td>
<td>(0.025)</td>
<td>(0.026)</td>
<td>(0.025)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target Effects</td>
<td>0.086</td>
<td>0.051</td>
<td>0.111</td>
<td>0.115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(CJK - Foreign)</td>
<td>(0.026)</td>
<td>(0.027)</td>
<td>(0.026)</td>
<td>(0.025)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Replication (Eight Countries)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign</td>
<td>0.582</td>
<td>0.538</td>
<td>0.508</td>
<td>0.510</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.024)</td>
<td>(0.024)</td>
<td>(0.024)</td>
<td>(0.024)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(SE)</td>
<td>411</td>
<td>446</td>
<td>447</td>
<td>418</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eight Countries</td>
<td>0.555</td>
<td>0.462</td>
<td>0.446</td>
<td>0.455</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.026)</td>
<td>(0.026)</td>
<td>(0.027)</td>
<td>(0.027)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(SE)</td>
<td>355</td>
<td>372</td>
<td>343</td>
<td>354</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difference</td>
<td>-0.027</td>
<td>-0.076</td>
<td>-0.062</td>
<td>-0.055</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Eight Countries - Foreign)</td>
<td>(0.030)</td>
<td>(0.029)</td>
<td>(0.030)</td>
<td>(0.030)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Response to Questions: 1) When you heard the word “Country A” in the previous question, did you think of any particular country?, 2) If yes, which country came to your mind when you heard the word “Country A”? (Percentage Breakdowns)
Response to Questions: 1) When you heard the word “Country A” in the previous question, did you think of any particular country? 2) If yes, which country came to your mind when you heard the word “Country A”? (Percentage Breakdowns)

Japan

- Did not think of any particular country: 91.25%
- CHN: 4.28%
- RUS: 0.37%
- USA: 0.19%
- RUS or CHN: 2.98%
- KOR: 0.93%
Study 1 - Generic Country Names as a Control Condition

Response to Questions: 1) When you heard the word “Country A” in the previous question, did you think of any particular country?, 2) If yes, which country came to your mind when you heard the word “Country A”? 

(Percentage Breakdowns)

Did not think of any particular country
CHN
JPN
RUS
USA
CHN or JPN
RUS or CHN
Korea

Did not think of any particular country
CHN
JPN
RUS
USA
CHN or JPN
RUS or CHN
Korea
(1) Priming with information about economic benefits

- Priming recalibrates weights one consideration over others (e.g., Chong and Druckman, 2007).

- Information about positive economic effects → more weights on 'material interests' and less on non-economic considerations (i.e., sentiments)
1. Priming with information about economic benefits

- Priming recalibrates weights one consideration over others (e.g., Chong and Druckman, 2007).
- Information about positive economic effects → more weights on ‘material interests’ and less on non-economic considerations (i.e., sentiments).

2. Spillover effects on security cooperation

- Security → trade (e.g., Glick and Taylor 2010; Keshk et al. 2004; Pollins 1989; Schultz 2015)
- Information about benefits of economic cooperation can enhance citizens’ support for security cooperation.